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 I 
 
Development, Transition and Divergence 
 
The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply 
staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else. 
— Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1988) 
 
When I was a student at the University of Chicago in the early 1980s, I had the 
opportunity of observing Professor Robert Lucas preparing his 1985 Marshall Lectures. It 
is a great honor for me to follow Professor Lucas’ steps to give the distinguished Lectures 
twenty-two years later. I returned to China in 1987 after graduating from the University 
of Chicago and doing one year of post-doctoral research at Yale University’s Growth 
Center. As the first person to return China from abroad with a PhD degree in economics 
after the reform started in 1979, I have had the privilege of experiencing in person the 
miraculous changes in China’s social and economic life and carrying out in situ research 
of China’s development and transition in the past twenty years.  Therefore, I would like 
to use this occasion to share with you my observations of developing country’s economic 
development and transition, based primarily on my experiences in China. 
 
It is a well-known fact that before the modern era, most countries were in the 
development stage of a relatively backward agricultural economy—disturbed from time 
to time by war and natural calamities, and afflicted by the Malthusian trap. Except for the 
ruling classes, craftsmen and merchants—who represented a minority of the population—
most people worked in agriculture. The allocation of resources in such agrarian 
economies was close to optimal through generations of practice; therefore, the gains from 
improvement in the allocation of resources were small (Schultz, 1964). Further economic 
development was feasible only with some exogenous technological shocks to the system. 
The accidental discovery of better technology during the daily work of peasants and 
craftsmen is one example of such a shock.
1 Another is the Great Geographic Discovery of 
                                                        
1 The adoption of certain technologies—for example, the replacement of the three-field cropping system   3
America in the fifteenth century, which brought back gold and silver to Europe as well as 
new crops—such as maize and potatoes—with better adaptability to various soil and 
climatic conditions. In this pre-modern era, economic development was manifested 
mainly in the form of population increase and the aggregate size of the economy. There 
was extensive growth, but per capita income did not change much (Clark, 2007; Kuznets, 
1966; Perkins, 1969). The income gap between areas that today would be considered 
developed and those that would be considered developing was relatively small from 
today’s viewpoint—estimated to be at most 50 per cent (Maddison, 2006; Bairoch, 1993). 
Some of today’s developing countries—such as China and part of India—were believed 
to be richer than Europe at that time (Cipolla, 1980; Pomeranz, 2000; Smith, 1776). Until 
the late eighteenth century, the overall performance of markets—in terms of integration—
in China and Western Europe was comparable (Shiue and Keller, 2007). 
 


















Note:  Gross domestic product (GDP) is calculated with 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollar. The 
Geary-Khamis dollar—also known as the international dollar—is a sophisticated aggregation method of 
calculating purchasing power parity (PPP). This facilitates comparing countries with one another. See, for 
example, the statistical definition at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/icp/ipc7_htm.htm 
Source: Maddison, A. (2006). The World Economy. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 642. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
with the more intensive two-field system in Europe—might be endogenous to the increase in population 
pressure, as argued by Boserup (1965). The invention of new technologies at that time, however, came 
about mostly through accidental discovery by peasants and artisans rather than through specific research 
efforts (Needham, 1969).    4
 
After the Industrial Revolution began in England in the mid-eighteenth century, 
experiments conducted in laboratories become the major source of technological 
invention and innovation (Lin, 1995; Landes, 1998; Needham, 1969; Rosenberg and 
Birdzell, 1986). This was especially true for those macro-inventions that consisted of 
radical new ideas and involved large, discrete, novel changes, as defined by Mokyr 
(1990). For developed countries at the technological frontier, such a transformation of the 
method of technological invention enabled them to accelerate technological advances 
through investment in research and development, and technological invention and 
innovation became endogenous (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). With increasing investment 
in research and development, technology change accelerated, industrial structures 
upgraded continuously and productivity increased. As a result, developed countries began 
to take off and the divergence between the North and the South appeared (Baumol, 1994; 
Braudel, 1984; Bairoch, 1983; Clark, 2007; Clark and Feenstra, 2001; Jones, 1981; 
Kuznets, 1966; Maddison, 2006; Rostow, 1960).  
 
Figure I.1 shows the per capita income in various regions of the world from 1–2001 AD, 
based on the estimation of Maddison (2006, p. 642). It shows that from an insignificant 
difference at the beginning of the eighteenth century, per capita income in the developed 
countries of Western Europe and its offshoots had increased to more than 20 times that of 
the developing countries by the end of the twentieth century. As Lucas (1988) reflected in 
his 1985 Marshall Lectures, ‘[S]uch diversity across countries in measured per capita 
income levels is literally too great to be believed.’ 
 
It is natural that governments and people in poor countries all over the world aspire to 
achieve the success of the rich countries in Europe and North America. Except for a few 
newly industrialised economies (NIEs) in East Asia, however—as shown in Figure I.2—
since World War II, most developing countries have failed to achieve their economic 
development goals and have even encountered frequent crises in spite of the many efforts 
of their governments independently or with assistance from international development 
agencies, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Agency.    5


























































































Note: GDP is calculated with 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Source:  Maddison, A. (2006). The World Economy. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
 
In most developing countries after World War II, governments adopted various policy 
measures to promote industrialisation (Chenery, 1961; Krueger, 1992; Lal, 1983). At that 
time, most economists were expecting to see rapid growth in resource-rich countries in 
Africa and Latin America, but the real success stories appeared in East Asia, where the 
endowment of natural resources was extremely poor. Japan was the first of these 
countries, followed by Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—the four East Asian 
NIEs—and, recently, by Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. In these economies in the 
early 1950s, the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of less than 2,000 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars—measured by 1990 purchasing power parity (PPP)—was the 
same as China at that time and was less than that in Eastern European and Latin America. 
Since the 1960s, the economies of the four East Asian NIEs maintained an annual growth 
rate of 10 per cent for two to three decades. Such growth has completely changed the 
poor and backward state of their economies. Figure I.2 shows that—measured by PPP—
income levels in Japan in the 1970s and in Singapore and Chinese Hong Kong in the 
1990s surpassed that of the United Kingdom. More importantly, wealth distribution in 
these economies became more equitable during their economic growth (Fei et al., 1979).   6
To some extent, they have realised their long-pursued goal of catching up with developed 
countries and building equitable societies—a dream held by many developing-country 
revolutionary leaders and social élites, such as Vladimir Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
 
Figure I.3 Per Capita GDP of China, Vietnam, Eastern European countries and the 

















































































Note: GDP is calculated with 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Source:  Maddison, A. (2006). The World Economy. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
 
Since the late 1970s, China and other socialist countries that implemented a planned 
economic system began the transition to a market economy in order to improve their 
economic performance. Figure I.3 shows that such a transition brought about rapid 
economic growth in China and Vietnam for more than two decades. The transitions that 
began in the early 1990s in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, 
however, led to dramatic declines in their economies and deterioration in most aspects of 
social development (World Bank, 2002a). A survey conducted in 2006 by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2007) and the World Bank of 29,000 
people in 29 countries—including  Eastern and southeastern Europe, the Baltic states, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia—found that only 30 per cent   7
believed their lives were better than in 1989. During the same period, most developing 
countries in other parts of the world followed the advice of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to implement reforms to reduce government intervention 
and enhance the role of the market. The result has, however, been disappointing. The 
economic performance of most developing countries has deteriorated (Barro, 1998; 
Easterly, 2001a).  
 
Continuous technological innovation and upgrading of industrial structures—as well as 
corresponding institutional changes—are the driving forces of long-term economic 
growth in modern times (Hayami and Godo, 2005; Kuznets, 1966; Landes, 1969; Marx, 
1867–94; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). By borrowing technology and institutions, a 
developing country has the advantage of backwardness (Gerschenkron, 1962; Landes, 
1969; Veblen, 1915). Like Germany, France and other countries in Western Europe in the 
nineteenth century and Japan and the NIEs in East Asia after World War II, a developing 
country can learn from the experience of developed countries in technology and 
institutions—and, like China and Vietnam, a transitional country can also emulate the 
well-functioning market institutions in the developed countries. This advantage enables 
them to undertake rapid technological improvements, upgrade their industry and adapt 
institutions at a relatively low cost and with less risk. Such an advantage can enable 
developing and transitional countries to maintain rapid economic growth for several 
decades, to narrow the gap between them and developed countries and even to overtake 
some of them. While Western European countries in the late nineteenth century and Japan 
and the NIEs in East Asia after World War II developed successfully, and while China 
and Vietnam succeeded in their transition, most other developing and transitional 
countries have failed to exploit such potential fully. This is the question that I will explore 
in the Lectures. 
   8
 II: 
The search for a fundamental and changeable cause of prosperity 
But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.  
—  John Maynard Keynes (1935) 
 
The dominant social thought shapes the institutionalized order of society…and the 
malfunctioning of established institutions in turn alters social thought. 
— Theodore W. Schultz (1977) 
 
How to develop a country is a subject that Adam Smith analysed in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776), which marked the birth of modern economics. The very diverse performances in 
economic development among various developing countries and in the transition among 
various socialist countries have recently revived economists’ interest in economic 
development. 
 
Recent studies have tried many ways to identify the determinants of economic growth in 
a country and have proposed various theories to explain why a country becomes wealthy 
and what actions a government in a poor country can take to improve its economic 
performance. Looking at the issue from an accounting perspective, the differences in per 
capita income between countries can be explained by the differences in their physical 
capital, human capital and productivity. From this point of view, the way for a country to 
become rich is to invest in physical and human capital and to adopt new and better 
technologies. Such differences are, however, just the proximate causes of the income 
differences between countries, as the accumulation of physical and human capital and 
productivity growth are themselves endogenous (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Lewis, 1955; 
Rodrik, 2003). It is necessary, therefore, to look for other fundamental factors that 
underpin the proximate causes of income differences between countries. 
 
Economists have proposed many fundamental determinants for the economic 
performance of a country. Acemoglu (2007) classifies these into four main causes. The   9
first is luck: uncertainty, heterogeneity in coordination, credit markets and government 
policies can enable one country experiencing otherwise identical conditions to another to 
escape poor equilibrium (Blanchard and Summers, 1987; Howitt and McAfee, 1988; 
Krugman, 1981, 1987, 1991; Leibenstein, 1957; Matsuyama, 1991; Murphy, et al., 1989; 
Myrdal, 1968; Nelson, 1956; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). The second is geography, which 
affects the proximate causes of growth through soil fertility, availability of certain key 
resources, the disease environment, transportation costs and so on (Diamond, 1997; 
Myrdal, 1968; Pomeranz, 2000; Sachs and Warner, 1997, 2001). The third factor is 
institutions, which shape the incentives to work and to invest in technology and physical 
and human capital (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002, 2005; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Easterly, 
2001b; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Needham, 1969; North, 1981, 1990; North and 
Thomas, 1973; Olson, 1982; Rodrik, 2003; Roland, 2007; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). 
The fourth factor is culture and social capital, including beliefs, values, preferences and 
trust, which affect people’s attitudes towards wealth, occupations, creativity and 
cooperation with others (Abramovitz, 1995; Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda and 
Putterman, 2007; Grief, 1994, 2004; Lal, 2005; Landes, 1998; Mokyr, 1990; North, 1994; 
Putnam 1993; Weber, 1930).  
 
Rodrik (2003) classifies the fundamental determinants of the economic performance of a 
country into three categories. In addition to geography and institutions in Acemoglu’s list, 
he adds integration or trade, which is determined by empirical evidence from studies by 
Dollar (1992), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1995) 
and which is advocated strongly by international organisations, including the World Bank, 
the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 
Luck as a fundamental determinant of income divergence in the long run is theoretically 
sound in models with multiple equilibria. However, the question is why the government 
and people of a country trapped in poor equilibrium would not change their behaviour or 
improve their coordination to shift from a bad equilibrium to a good equilibrium. In fact, 
we have seen that some countries that have been trapped in poverty for centuries   10
suddenly embark on dynamic growth, such as the East Asian NIEs in the 1960s and 
China after the reforms in 1979.  Then what is the factor that triggers the sudden change?  
 
Although geography is the only exogenous variable in the list of fundamental 
determinants, it is not destiny (Rodrik, 2003). Most of Australia is arid, desert or tropical 
land; Singapore and Mauritius are tropical countries; Switzerland and Botswana are 
landlocked. All these conditions are considered disadvantages for long-term economic 
growth in the geography hypothesis; however, Switzerland, Australia and Singapore are 
among the world’s richest countries and Mauritius and Botswana have enjoyed dynamic 
growth in recent decades. European countries in the eighteenth century and earlier were 
plagued with many diseases (Clark, 2007): it was economic development that enabled 
them to eradicate those diseases and improve their environment. The impoverished 
environment in poor countries is, therefore, a consequence and not a cause of their failure 
to achieve economic development.  
 
Some economists regard trade and integration—or, more carefully, government policy 
towards trade—as a fundamental determinant. It is true that successful countries have 
benefited from trade and foreign direct investment. Careful examination of the empirical 
evidence, however, shows that specific public policies directed at international economic 
integration or disintegration do not correlate well with economic performance (Rodríguez 
and Rodrik, 2001). Moreover, it will be clear from this Lectures that trade or the 
openness of a country is endogenous to the government’s development strategy. Trade 
should not, therefore, be considered the fundamental determinant of long-term growth in 
a country. 
 
The proponents of the culture hypothesis argue that through its effects on shaping 
people’s attitudes towards work, leisure, risk, education, creativity and trust in other 
people, a country’s culture determines its economic performance. Culture is, however, a 
given or slowly changing factor. The difficulty of taking culture as the fundamental 
determinant of economic development is that it cannot explain why a country suddenly   11
starts to take off after a period of long stagnation—such as the NIEs in East Asia in the 
1960s and China and India after the 1980s. Neither can it explain why countries with the 
same culture—such as South Korea and North Korea, as well as West and East 
Germany—have dramatic differences in economic performance. Moreover, culture can 
change as a result of economic development—rather than being a cause of it. The hard-
working attitude of Japanese workers has been impressive and praised throughout the world 
today, however, a quotation from a report written in 1915 by an Australian expert invited by 
the Japanese government to visit the country will suffice to illustrate the above point: 
 
My impression as to your cheap labour was soon disillusioned when I saw your 
people at work. No doubt they are lowly paid, but the return is equally so; to see 
your men at work made me feel that you are a very satisfied easy-going race who 
reckon time is no object. When I spoke to some managers they informed me that it 
was impossible to change the habits of national heritage [emphasis added]. (Cited 
in Bhagwati, 1983) 
 
Economists working on development and transition have come to believe that 
institutions—which shape the incentives of a society—are the fundamental determinant 
of economic performance and long-run growth in a country. They believe that a country 
will have dynamic growth and become rich if it has good institutions, which provide 
incentives for work, accumulate human and physical capital, acquire better technology 
and improve resource allocation. If a country has poor institutions—which deprive people 
of the incentives to do the right thing for economic growth—it will be poor and will 
stagnate. Institutions are, however, endogenous, and are determined by other social, 
economic and political factors in the economy (Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Friedman, 
2005; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Marx and Engels, 1848; Lin, 1989; Lin and Nugent, 
1995; North, 1981; North and Thomas, 1973). Moreover, most institutions are also a 
slowly changing factor although a few institutions may be able to change quickly (Roland, 
2007).  For the proponents of the institutional hypothesis, therefore, two questions need   12
to be answered: first, what causes some countries to have good institutions and others to 
have bad institutions; and second, without significant changes to their bad institutions, 
why do some countries start to have a new path of dynamic growth? 
 
The proponents of the institutional hypothesis focus their studies mostly on the first 
question and approach the issue from the conflicts of vested interests. Olson (1982) 
emphasises the effect on institutions of the growth of distributional coalitions in a country, 
which is a function of the duration of stability in a country. He argues that as time goes 
on without a revolution or other upheaval in the social structure, more and more special 
interests will form successful coalitions for rent seeking and the society will become 
increasingly ‘sclerotic’ because of this and because of the growth of bureaucratic 
sluggishness within the special-interest organisations themselves.  
 
Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001) see the structure of government regulations and 
interventions in a country as a result of political equilibrium in which special-interest 
groups bid for protection with their campaign support and politicians maximize their own 
welfare, which depends on total contributions collected and on the welfare of voters.  
Using trade policy as an illustration, they argue that the special-interest groups may 
prefer inefficient distortions to transfer income rather than more efficient means.  
 
Based on the studies of economic development in the New World of North and South 
America, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) propose that in places where Europeans 
faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive 
institutions; whereas in places with low mortality rates, they formed neo-European 
societies with institutions carried from Europe. Those bad and good institutions persist to 
the present. 
 
Similarly, based on the early history of colonies in the New Word after the sixteenth 
century, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) emphasise the pervasive influence of factor 
endowments on the quality of institutions. According to their argument, in the colonies 
that were endowed with climates and soils that gave them a comparative advantage in   13
plantation of sugar and coffee—lucrative crops at that times—or were rich in minerals, 
the production used a large number of slave labour because of the economies of scale in 
using such type of labour. The powerful colonial élites were able to establish social and 
political institutions that guaranteed them disproportional shares of political power and 
income distribution in order to maintain their status, at the cost of economic growth—
which Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue is the case in Latin America. Meanwhile, 
they argue that the soil and climate in what became the United States and Canada were 
not favourable for large-scale plantation and mineral production and there was no large 
native population to provide labour. The development of the United States and Canada 
depended, therefore, mostly on labourers of European descent who had relatively high 
and similar levels of human capital. The distribution of land was more equal because of 
the limited advantages to large-scale production of grain and hay; therefore, wealth and 
political power were distributed more equally, which contributed to the formation of 
institutions that provided the population with broad access to economic opportunities and 
incentives for investment in human and physical capital as well as technology, enabling 
the countries to sustain long-run growth and prosperity. 
 
While the hypothesis of the importance of institutions is agreeable and vested-interest 
groups may influence the formation of institutions that affect economic growth—as 
proposed by Olson (1982), Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
2002, 2005) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), the question why the growth in some 
countries suddenly takes off still remain unanswered. As already discussed, countries 
such as the East Asian NIEs after the 1960s, Chile after the 1970s and China, Vietnam 
and India in the 1980s, which escaped the poverty trap and started a new era of dynamic 
growth, did not have observable changes in the duration of their social stability and in the 
deprivation of the élite’s political and economic powers—at least in the beginning. 
Moreover, socialist countries with initial similar powerful vested-interest groups have 
adopted different transitional institutions and have achieved dramatically different 
economic performances in their transitions to a market economy. We need, therefore, to 
search for other fundamental but changeable determinants. 
   14
I agree with Keynes (1935, p. 384) when he wrote as the concluding sentence in The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money ‘But, soon or late, it is ideas, not 
vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil’. The hypothesis I would like to 
propose is as follows.  
 
The various institutions that hinder economic development in most former socialist and 
developing countries today are shaped by their governments, which followed inadequate 
ideas about the priority development of capital-intensive heavy industry in the 1950s 
when the capital in their economies was scarce. The failure of many former socialist and 
developing countries to achieve dynamic growth in their transitional processes is due also 
to their governments’ specific transition strategy based on inadequate ideas, which 
ignored the existence of large amounts of non-viable firms in the economy, and the fact 
that the distorted institutions that existed before the transition were in fact second-best 
arrangements for protecting the non-viable firms. 
 
The government is the most important institution in any country as the membership in a 
state is universal and the State has powers of compulsion over its citizens not given to 
other economic organisations (Stiglitz, 1989),. Because of its compulsive power, the 
government has a substantial degree of freedom in adopting policies that will affect the 
functions of other institutions in society. With good use of its power, a developing-
country government can gradually reform its backward institutions, improving incentives 
for entrepreneurs and workers, increasing savings and accumulation in the national 
economy for investment in new industries and technologies, and improving resource-
allocation efficiency in the economy. It can also encourage and facilitate enterprises to 
learn from developed countries and upgrade their industrial structures and technology. On 
the other hand, with incorrect use of its power, the government can create distortions in 
the system and consequently hurt incentives for entrepreneurs and workers. It can further 
distort resource allocation and create rampant rent-seeking behaviour, causing unequal 
income distribution and giving rise to low efficiency and frequent economic and financial   15
crises. The policies adopted by a government are, therefore, key to the success or failure 
of that country’s economic development. As Lewis (1955, p. 376) insightfully observed, 
‘[N]o country has made economic progress without positive stimulus from intelligent 
governments…on the other hand, there are so many examples of the mischief done to 
economic life by governments that it is easy to fill one’s pages with warnings against 
government participation in economic life.’ This is especially true in developing 
countries, as the constraints on government power are generally weaker than in 
developed countries. A more interesting question is whether the government has the 
incentive and ability to design and impose suitable institutions to facilitate the economic 
development in the country.   
 
Political leaders operate the government. If we want to analyse the quality of a 
government’s policies and institutions, we need to understand what motivates the political 
leaders to determine government policies (Lin, 1989). A political leader certainly worries 
about the security of his/her tenure in office and his/her own position in the nation’s 
history. Regardless of the political system, the best way to achieve security of tenure and 
to establish a leader’s historical status is to bring prosperity to the nation. As Alfred 
Marshall (1920, p. xvii) put it, ‘[E]conomic motives are not exclusively selfish. The 
desire for money does not exclude other influence; and may itself arise from noble 
motives.’ The motivation and behaviour of political leaders are not necessarily shaped by 
narrow, selfish, pecuniary interests. I will argue in next section that many political leaders 
in developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s—especially the first-generation leaders 
who brought political and economic independence to their countries through long periods 
of revolution or struggle—were motivated by their desire for their nation’s modernisation 
rather than by selfish vested interests. In pursuing modernisation, the leaders adopted 
certain strategies—which consisted of a set of policies—as a vehicle to achieve their 
goals.
2 The set of policies shaped the institutions in their countries, which in turn affected 
                                                        
2 My definition of ‘strategy’ is similar to that of Rodrik (2005).    16
their economic performance.
3 The strategy adopted by political leaders was, however, 
influenced by the dominant social thinking at the time, which—as defined by Schultz 
(1977)—consisted of various social, political and economic ideas. Due to the complex 
nature of dynamic growth in a developing country and the political leaders’ bounded 
rationality in understanding the subject, it is practical for political leaders to follow the 
dominant social thinking in the pursuit of national development. Moreover, following the 
dominant social thinking will make it easier for political leaders to mobilise public 
support for their policies. As argued by Schultz, therefore, it is the dominant social 
thinking that shapes the institutional order of developing countries.
4  
 
As I will argue, however, the dominant social thinking about achieving modernisation in 
the 1950s and 1960s was based on incorrect perceptions of the causes for and constraints 
on a developing country’s modernisation. Except for a few economies in East Asia, which 
escaped the influences of the dominant social thinking at that time, the established 
institutions in the developing countries performed poorly and not only failed to deliver 
the promise of making the countries as successful as developed countries but caused 
frequent crises and even disastrous consequences in their economies. The failure of 
economic strategies and established institutions in turn altered the dominant social 
thinking and led developing countries—socialist and non-socialist—to start the 
institutional reforms and transitions that occurred in the 1980s, as predicted by Schultz. 
The dominant social thinking about the approach for transition in the 1980s and 1990s 
was, however, again based on an incorrect understanding of the underlying causes of the 
poor performance and constraints on the developing countries. Except for a few countries, 
such as China and Vietnam—whose governments were not influenced by the dominant 
                                                        
3 Lewis (1955) emphasises the role of political leaders in a country’s development. The case study of 
Botswana by Acemoglu et al. (2003) found that a number of far-sighted decisions by post-independence 
political leaders shaped good institutions, which in turn helped Botswana achieve an average annual growth 
rate of more than 9 per cent since independence in 1965. Empirically, it was found that an exogenous 
change in the national leader had a significant impact on a country’s growth rate, from a panel data set 
including 130 countries since World War II (Jones and Olken, 2005). 
4 The importance of ideas in determining the institutions is also emphasised by North (1996), Lal (1994), 
and Lal and Mynit (1996).   17
social thinking at that time—most developing countries encountered severe set-backs in 
their economies during the transition process.
5 
 
In the following sections, I will analyse why the dominant social thinking about 
developing countries’ modernisation in the 1950s and 1960s and about transition in the 
1980s and 1990s were incorrect and how they shaped government policies and the 
established institutions in developing countries. I will also discuss why the governments 
of a few economies in East Asia escaped the influence of the dominant social thinking in 
the 1950s and 1960s and why China and Vietnam did not follow the transitional approach 
advocated by the dominant social thinking in the 1980s and 1990s. 
                                                        
5  If the propositions of Olson (1982), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) and Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) are valid, the destiny of a nation depends on its history. As argued by Arthur Lewis (1955, 
p. 418), however, ‘If we ask why a people has made a certain choice, the answer lies usually in its history; 
but if we ask why it has had that particular history, we are back among the mysteries of the universe. 
Fortunately, not all the answers depend upon history.’ According to my proposition, the destiny of a nation 
can change. When the leadership in a country follows a new idea and adopts new policies, it can set off 
dynamic growth.    18
 
III 
Aspiration and Social Thought of Modernization 
Without heavy industry there can be no solid national defense, no well-being for the 
people, no prosperity and strength for the nation. 
— Mao Zedong (1945) 
 
No country can be politically and economically independent, even within the framework 
of international interdependence, unless it is highly industrialized and has developed its 
power resources to the utmost. 
—Jawaharlal Nehru (1946) 
 
Keynes (1926, p. 16) wrote, ‘[A] study of the history of opinion is a necessary 
preliminary to the emancipation of the mind.’ In this section, I will review the evolution 
of social thinking regarding the role of the government in the industrialisation and 
transition of developing countries. 
 
Before the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, China was more industrialised 
than the West (Cipolla, 1980; Elvin, 1973; Jones, 1981; Needham, 1969). In the 
seventeenth century, the Indian Subcontinent was not significantly less developed than 
Britain and, before 1800, India was a major supplier of cotton and silk textiles in 
international markets, including Europe (Dutt, 1992). After the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain in the mid-eighteenth century, and in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, 
the West was quickly industrialised and enhanced its economic, military and political 
power to achieve a dominant position in the world—and the great divergence between the 
industrialised North and the agrarian South emerged. India, like many other parts of the 
world, became a colony. China was defeated repeatedly by the industrialised powers after 
the Opium War in 1840, and became a quasi-colony, ceding extraterritorial rights in 
treaty ports to 20 foreign countries; its customs revenue was controlled by foreigners; and 
it surrendered territory to Britain, Japan and Russia. Like China and India, most   19
developing countries were unable to control their own fate; their economies were 
plundered and exploited by the colonisers.  
 
After World War I, nationalism became a popular trend and, after World War II, most 
colonies became independent—led by veteran leaders of the various independence 
movements. The emergence of previous colonies or semi-colonies as newly independent 
states in Asia and the Middle East, and later in Africa, was accompanied by strong 
nationalist sentiments. Compared with developed countries, these developing countries 
had an extremely low economic growth rate and per capita gross national product (GNP), 
high birth and death rates, low average educational attainments and very little 
infrastructure—and they were heavily specialised in the production and export of primary 
commodities and imported most of their manufactured goods. Thus, it was central to 
every developing government’s national agenda to develop its economy independently so 
as to achieve a rapid economic take-off and eliminate poverty. As such, many developing 
country governments regarded economic growth as their direct and prime responsibility. 
 
Lack of industrialisation—especially the possession of large heavy industries, which 
were the basis of military strength and economic power—had forced China, India and 
other areas in the developing world to yield to the colonial powers. It was natural, 
therefore, for the political and social élites in the developing world to adopt an ideology 
of economic nationalism and to prioritise the development of large heavy, advanced 
industries in their countries after they gained political independence from colonial rule 
(Lal and Mynt, 1996, chapter 7). In effect, the political leaders in Australia and Germany, 
France and other countries in Western Europe in the nineteenth century pursued exactly 
the same goal when they saw the contrasts between Britain’s rising industrial power and 
the backwardness of their own predominately agrarian economies (Gerschenkron, 1962). 
 
The desire to develop heavy industries existed before the social élites obtained political 
power. Dr Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, proposed the development of ‘key 
and basic industries’ as a priority in his plan for China’s industrialisation in 1919 (Sun,   20
1929).
6 Similarly, before the success of the socialist revolution, in a meeting in 1944, 
Mao Zedong, the leader of Communist Party of China, advocated: 
 
 [T]he root cause of China’s backwardness is the lack of modern industries. …. 
Therefore, it is our nation’s mission to extricate ourselves from the 
backwardness. The people support the Communist Party of China because the 
Party represents the demands of our nation as well as our people. If we cannot 
solve economic problems, if we are unable to build up modern industries, and if 
we are incapable of enhancing productivities, the people would not necessary 
support us.’ (Quoted from Mao, 1944, pp. 146–8, translated by the author).  
 
.Zhou Enlai—the prime minister after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949 and an intimate associate of Mao—also quoted Mao in a speech given in 1953:  
 
[C]hairman Mao once said: our nation has obtained political independence, but 
if our nation wants to achieve complete independence, the completion of 
industrialisation is necessary. If the industry is not developed, a country may 
become the other country’s vassal even after the country has obtained 
independence. As a socialist country, can we have a dependence mentality? For 
example, let the USSR develop heavy industries and national defense industries 
and let our nation develop light industries. Can we do that? In my opinion, we 
cannot do that. (Zhou, 1953, p. 253, translated by the author)  
 
The Communist Party won the revolution and founded the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. After three years’ recovery from the wars, under the leadership of Mao, China 
started its First Five-Year Plan in 1953. The purpose of the plan was expressed explicitly 
as: ‘Concentrating nation’s efforts on the industrial development with heavy industries as 
the core in order to build up the primary base of socialist industrialization.’(CPC, 1955). 
                                                        
6  Understanding the lack of capital in China, Dr Sun planned to borrow foreign capital for China’s 
industrialisation. His position was different from Mao’s and many other revolutionary leaders in China and 
in other developing countries, who advocated the idea of self-reliance.   21
In 1957, Mao further proposed to make China’s industrial power exceed that of Great 
Britain in 10 years and to catch up with that of the United States in 15 years (Teiwes with 
Sun, 1999).  
 
Similarly, the leadership of the freedom movement in India pressed hard for industrial 
development, even while the political struggle was going on. The Congress Party 
established a National Planning Committee to chart industrial development nearly a 
decade before India became independent (Dhar, 2003). In a speech, Jawaharlal Nehru—
India’s leader in the independence movement and the country’s first prime minister—
proclaimed:  
 
[N]o modern nation can exist without certain essential articles which can be 
produced only by big industry. Nor to produce these is to rely on imports from 
abroad and thus to be subservient to the economy of foreign countries…Big 
industry must be encouraged and developed as rapidly as possible, but the type 
of industry thus encouraged should be chosen with care. It should be heavy and 
basic industry, which is the foundation of a nation’s economic strength and on 
which other industries can gradually be built up. (cited in Srinivasan, 1994)  
 
Under the leadership of Nehru, therefore, the Indian government’s industrial policy 
resolutions of 1948 and 1956 entrusted the public sector with responsibility for 
developing basic and heavy industry and saw such development as a precondition for the 
development and expansion of the private sector (Dutt and Sundharam, 2006). With the 
assistance of Professor Prasanta Mahalanobis, India began to pursue the development of 
basic and heavy machine-building industries in its second five-year plan, which began in 
1956. 
 
In Latin America, political leaders and social élites were influenced strongly by the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, the economic difficulty encountered during the Great 
Depression in the 1930s and by the thesis developed by Prebisch (1950) and Singer 
(1950). They believed that the decline in terms of trade against the export of primary   22
commodities was secular, resulting in the transfer of income from resource-intensive 
developing countries to capital-intensive developed countries—something that could be 
combated only by efforts to develop domestic manufacturing industries through a process 
known as import substitution. 
 
The idea of prioritising the development of heavy industry in developing countries also 
drew on the intellectual support of the writing of Marx and Lenin and the USSR’s 
successful experience of industrialisation before World War II. In Das Kapital, Marx—
based on Quesnay’s Tableau Économique (1758–59)
7—used a two-sector model, in 
which the first sector produced the means of production (that is, heavy industry) and the 
second sector produced consumer goods (that is, light industry and agriculture) to study 
the reproduction process. In the analysis, Marx argued that the means-of-production 
sector should grow faster than the consumption-goods sector in the modern production 
mode.  
 
Following Marx, Lenin stressed the needs to prioritised development of large heavy 
industry in a frequently cited article entitled ‘On the so-called question of the market’, 
written in 1893. The position was reaffirmed in ‘The immediate tasks of the Soviet 
government’, written after the Bolshevik Revolution (Lenin, 1918), in which Lenin said, 
‘[T]he raising of the productivity of labour first of all requires that the material basis of 
large-scale industry shall be assured, namely, the development of the production of fuel, 
iron, the engineering and chemical industries.’ Due, however, to the chaos and destruction 
of the civil war (1918–20) immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin was unable 
to put into practice the prioritisation of heavy-industry development and adopted the   
New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 to restore the shattered agricultural economy. After 
succeeding Lenin and consolidating his power, Stalin started to pursue earnestly the 
prioritised development of heavy industries in 1929 through a series of five-year plans 
(Gregory and Harrison, 2005; Gregory and Stuart, 2001). The share of heavy industry in 
Soviet industrial output rose rapidly (Moravcik, 1965; Allen, 2003) and the Soviet Union 
                                                        
7 For an authoritative compilation of the various editions of the Tableau, see Kuczynsky and Meek (1972).   23
quickly became a global military power before World War II.
8 
 
Running parallel with the aspiration for heavy-industry development in developing 
countries, in academic circles was a dominant view of ‘market failure’ due to structural 
rigidities and coordination problems—the body of thought that became ‘development 
economics’. 
9 Under the influence of Keynesianism and belief in the economic success of 
the Soviet Union, the mainstream theories in development economics at that time held 
that the market encompassed insurmountable defects and the government was a powerful 
supplementary means to accelerate the pace of economic development. Many 
development economists at that time advocated that the government should play a leading 
role in the industrialisation push, directly allocating the resources for investment, setting 
up public enterprises in the large heavy industries to control the ‘commanding heights’ in 
                                                        
8 In 1929, the Great Depression began in the West. During the 1930s, economic development in the West 
was beset with crises and stagnation. Led by Stalin, the Soviet Union adopted a planned economic system 
and prioritised the development of heavy industries. As the country with the most abundant natural 
resources per capita in the world, it had great potential to sustain its investment-led growth by mobilising 
natural resources to support investment. Before World War II, the Soviet Union had already become 
industrialised, with strong military industries. The disadvantages of the planned economy were not revealed 
until the 1970s. The sharp contrast in economic performance between the Soviet Union and the developed 
capitalist countries in the 1930s had a profound impact on the thinking and policies of social élites and 
political leaders in the developing world after World War II. 
9   The new field of development economics was regarded as covering underdevelopment because 
‘conventional economics’ did not apply (Hirschman, 1982). Early trade and development theories and 
policy prescriptions were based on some widely accepted stylised facts and premises about developing 
countries (Krueger, 1997); these included: 1) developing economies’ production structures were oriented 
heavily towards primary commodity production; 2) if developing countries adopted policies of free trade, 
their comparative advantage would forever lie in primary commodity production; 3) the global income 
elasticity and the price elasticity of demand for primary commodities were low; 4) capital accumulation 
was crucial for growth and, in the early stage of development, it could occur only with the importation of 
capital goods. Based on these stylised facts and premises, it was a straight step to believe that the process of 
development was industrialisation, and industrialisation consisted primarily of the substitution of domestic 
production of manufactured goods for imports (Chenery, 1958). 
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order to overcome market failures (Hirschman, 1958;  Nurkse, 1953; Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1943).  
 
The idea that the government in a lagging country needs to support the manufacturing 
industry in order to catch up with developed countries can be traced to the writings of 
List (1841), the ‘father’ of the infant-industry argument for protection. He argued that 
each lagging nation should foster the development of its own manufactures by import 
duties and even outright prohibitions and only by this means could countries such as 
Germany, Russia and the United States—which at that time were less developed than 
Britain—ever hope to compete on equal terms with Britain. After List’s death in 1846, 
Otto von Bismarck—the prime minister of Germany’s Second Reich—put the ideas List 
advocated into practice, in 1879. Bismarck used protective tariffs and direct government 
support in the development of iron, steel and other large heavy industries and turned 
Germany from a relatively less-developed agrarian economy into a major industrialised 
power in a short time. List’s ideas and Germany’s industrialisation experience impressed 
social élites and national leaders in India and other parts of the developing world and 
shaped their thinking about the government’s role and industrial policies in their national 
development—even to this day (Dhar, 2003). 
 
Lal (1983) calls List’s policy recommendations and the early development economics 
‘dirigiste dogma’. Based on the teachings of development economics at that time, the 
international development agencies that were established after World War II—such as the 
World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)—advised enthusiastically the governments in developing countries to play an 
active role in overcoming market failures in their industrial development. 
 
Aspirations and ideas have consequences. After World War II, most developing 
countries—including socialist and non-socialist countries in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa—adopted a development strategy that prioritised large advanced, capital-intensive 
industries (referred to commonly as the heavy industry-oriented development strategy or 
import-substitution strategy) to ensure their nations’ independence, to achieve higher   25
living standards for their people and to avoid exploitation by developed countries. They 
hoped that this strategy would help to establish an industrial system that was similar to 
those in developed countries. I will argue in next section, however, that it is incorrect to 
refer to the lack of spontaneous development of heavy industry in a developing country 
as a market failure. Advanced capital-intensive heavy industry does not fit with the 
comparative advantages of developing countries; firms in heavy industries will not be 
viable in undistorted, open, competitive markets. It is the viability problem—and not 
market rigidities or coordination failures—that causes the lack of large advanced, capital-
intensive industry in developing countries. I will show that, due to this incorrect 
diagnosis, government policies based on the dominant social thinking at the time resulted 
in pervasive government failures in developing countries, which have been discussed 
extensively by Bauer (1984), Lal (1983) and Krueger (1990)—to name just a few.   26
IV. 
Development strategy, viability and Performance 
 
The key characteristic of the endowment structure
10 in developing countries is a relative 
abundance of natural resources or unskilled labour and a scarcity of human and physical 
capital. In developing countries with abundant unskilled labour or resources but scarce 
human and physical capital, only the labour-intensive and resource-intensive industries 
will have comparative advantages in open, competitive markets; and in developed 
countries with abundant capital and relatively scarce labour, capital-intensive industries 
will be the most competitive
11 (Ohlin, 1967; Heckscher and Ohlin 1991; Lin, 2003; Lin 
and Zhang, 2007). The development strategy advocated by the dominant social thinking 
in development economics in the 1950s and 1960s in essence was a comparative 
advantage-defying (CAD) strategy. 
 
Under a CAD strategy, firms in prioritised industries cannot survive in an open, 
competitive market because they are in conflict with the comparative advantages 
determined by their endowment structure and will require higher costs to produce goods 
than firms in countries with a comparative advantage in the same industries. Even if they 
are well managed, they cannot earn a socially acceptable profit in an undistorted, open, 
                                                        
10 Endowment structure refers to the relative abundance of capital, labour and natural resources.  
11 The principle of comparative advantage—based on different labour productivity—has its origin in the 
works of David Ricardo, J. S. Mill and Alfred Marshall. The modern version of comparative advantage 
proposed by Heckscher and Ohlin (1991) is based on the comparative cost, due to the differences in the 
factor endowment structure. I draw inspiration from Heckscher and Ohlin (1991). In their model, however, 
the technology in each industry is assumed to be identical in the developed and developing countries and a 
country should produce more goods that use its abundant factor intensively to exchange for goods that use 
its scarce factor intensively. However, more realistically, the technologies used in the developed and 
developing countries are not identical. Lin and Zhang (2007) build a dynamic model to show that a country 
should go into the industries and adopt the technologies that use its abundant factor intensively to produce 
goods. They model allows a country to move up its technology and industry ladders along with the 
upgrading of its endowment structure from relative scarcity in capital to relative abundance in capital.   27
competitive market. I refer to these firms as non-viable.
12 In other words, these non-
viable enterprises are unable to survive in an open, competitive market even if they are 
well managed; and, unless the government provides subsidisation and protection, no one 
will invest in or continue to operate such firms. The lack of capital-intensive industries in 
developing countries is not, therefore, due to market rigidity but to the non-viability of 
the firms in an undistorted, open, competitive market.
13  
 
As I will show in the mathematic model in the appendix, in order to implement a CAD 
strategy, a developing-country government has to protect numerous non-viable 
enterprises; however, because these governments usually have limited tax-collection 
capacities, such large-scale protection and subsidisation cannot be sustained with their 
fiscal resources. The government has to resort to administrative measures—granting the 
non-viable enterprises in prioritised industries a market monopoly, suppressing interest 
rates,
14  over-valuing domestic currency and controlling prices for raw materials—to 
reduce the costs of investment and operation for the non-viable enterprises. Such 
                                                        
12 A normally managed firm is expected to earn a socially acceptable profit in a free, competitive market 
without government protection or subsidisation; I call such firms viable. There could be many factors that 
affect the viability of a firm. In this Lectures, as well as in my other works, I use the term ‘non-viability’ to 
describe the inability of normally managed firms to earn socially acceptable profits due to their choice of 
industry, product and technology away from those deemed optimal by the economy’s endowment structure.  
13 The models based on increasing returns, such as Krugman (1981, 1987, 1991) and Matsuyama (1991), 
and coordination of investments, such as Murphy et al. (1989), assume that the endowment structure of 
each country is identical, and, therefore, that firms will be viable in an undistorted, open, competitive 
market once the government helps the firms overcome market failure and escape the poor-equilibrium trap. 
Such models could be appropriate for considering the government’s role in assisting firms to compete with 
those in other countries in a similar stage of development. Such models are, however, inappropriate as 
policy guidance for developing countries that are attempting to catch up with developed countries because 
the endowment structures in developing and developed countries are different. With government help, a 
developing country might be able to set up firms in advanced capital-intensive industries; however, because 
of the scarcity of human and physical capital, the comparative cost of production of firms in the developing 
country will be higher than for firms in a developed country. The firms will, therefore, still be non-viable in 
an undistorted, open, competitive market. The government needs to support and protect the firms 
continuously after they have been set up. 
14 The financial repression discussed by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) is a result of this strategy.    28
intervention will cause widespread shortages in funds, foreign exchange and raw 
materials. The government, therefore, needs to allocate these resources directly to these 
enterprises through administrative channels, including national planning in the socialist 
countries and credit rationing, investment and entry licensing in non-socialist developing 
countries.
15  Although these administrative measures can build up industries that are in 
conflict with the comparative advantage of the economy, serious information problems 
arise. Under information asymmetry, because the government cannot participate directly 
in the management of firms, it is impossible to determine the necessary amount of 
protection and subsidisation. When an enterprise incurs a loss, therefore—even if it is due 
to mismanagement or the moral-hazard problems of managers—the blame will fall on the 
government for insufficient protection and subsidisation, and the enterprise will use this 
as an excuse to ask for even more protection. When the government is responsible for the 
losses of such enterprises, soft-budget constraint problems will arise (Lin and Tan, 
1999)
16 and rent-seeking behaviour will be pervasive (Krueger, 1974). It is also inevitable 
that some government officials will use their power to intervene with the management of 
the enterprises and elicit bribery, when the government needs to protect and subsidise the 
enterprises repeatedly.  
 
After the adoption of a CAD strategy, in addition to the problems discussed above, a 
developing country might no longer benefit from the advantage of backwardness. It can 
no longer borrow technology from developed countries to accelerate its technological 
innovation and upgrade its industrial structure, because the development of new 
technology—either through independent research or foreign borrowing—requires capital 
investment. Under a CAD strategy, because the limited capital resources are used to 
develop prioritised capital-intensive industries, the labour-intensive industries that have 
                                                        
15 The excessive regulation and administrative control will cause many private activities to escape into 
informal sectors (de Soto, 1987). 
16 The soft-budget constraint is a term coined by Kornai (1986), which became a popular research subject 
after the article by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). According to Kornai, the soft-budget constraint is a 
result of the paternalism of a socialist state; and, according to Dewatripont and Maskin, it is an endogenous 
phenomenon, arising from a time inconsistency problem. In Lin and Tan (1999) and Lin and Li 
(forthcoming), I argue that the soft-budget constraint arises from the policy burdens imposed on enterprises.   29
comparative advantages cannot receive sufficient financial support and have to rely on 
traditional technologies. Firms in the prioritised industries are unable to produce an 
economic surplus due to the violation of comparative advantage.
17 Firms in the industries 
consistent with the economy’s comparative advantage will produce fewer surpluses than 
they could otherwise produce because of their difficulty in accessing necessary capital for 
investment. Therefore, little economic surplus is generated and the surplus available for 
investment in the next period is limited. For those newly established capital-intensive 
industries—even though they are quite advanced in technology at the time of 
investment—the technology gap with developed countries will soon widen. Due to patent 
protections and embargoes on advanced technology from developed countries, it is 
difficult to borrow new advances at low cost in the advanced industries. At the same time, 
independent research and development will require too much capital investment and 
involve too high risk. With an overall poor economic performance and limited surplus, 
the ability to carry out such research will inevitably fall short. After a few years, these 
once advanced industries will become obsolete. As a result, technological progress in the 
prioritised industries and the whole economy will be very slow. 
 
A CAD strategy will also affect income distribution. In socialist countries that have 
eliminated capitalists, the development of prioritised industries can be realised through 
direct government investment, accompanied by suppression and equalisation of wage 
rates though administrative measures. The equality is artificial. In other market-based 
countries, however, income distribution will be polarized (Lin and Chen, 2007). In those 
countries, only wealthy and crony capitalists with intimate relationships with the 
government and opportunities to access bank loans and fiscal resources have the ability to 
invest in the prioritised capital-intensive industries. Since subsidies to the prioritised 
industries have to come from workers and peasants—either directly or indirectly. Even if 
a fast investment-led growth is achieved at the begin, the poor will not benefit from the 
                                                        
17 With the government’s protection and subsidisation, firms in the prioritised industries might appear to be 
very profitable. These profits, however, come from the transfer of surplus from other industries through the 
government’s administrative measures. Such profits do not constitute a ‘real’ economic surplus in the 
economy.    30
growth (Lal and Myint, 1996) Therefore, the adoption of a CAD strategy will inevitably 
worsen income distribution. Meanwhile, because the prioritised industries are capital 
intensive, they can generate only limited employment opportunities. The labour-intensive 
industries that could generate more employment opportunities cannot develop fully due 
to the lack of capital. As a result, large numbers of labourers are either retained in rural 
areas or become unemployed or semi-employed, leading to further polarisation in income 
distribution.  
 
In summary, while the adoption of a CAD strategy can establish some advanced 
industries in developing countries, it inevitably leads to inefficient resource allocation, 
suppressed working incentives, rampant rent-seeking behaviour, deteriorating income 
distribution and poor economic performance. In the end, more haste, less speed. The 
adoption of a CAD strategy will not narrow the gap with developed countries; instead, 
the gap will become wider and wider.
18 
 
What the political leaders and social élites fail to recognise is the fact that the industrial 
and technological structures in developed countries are determined endogenously by their 
economic endowment structures. Without government interventions, industries in 
developing countries are more labour and resource intensive because human and physical 
capital is relatively scarce and labour and resources are relatively abundant. Since 
industrial and technological structures are endogenous to the endowment structure of the 
                                                        
18 In the models of Olson (1982), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005), Grossman and Helpman (1996 and 
2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), government intervention, institutional distortions and rent 
seeking arise from the capture of government by powerful vested-interest élites. Logically, their models can 
explain some observed interventions and distortions, such as import quotas, tax subsidies, entry regulations 
and so on. Their theories cannot, however, explain the existence of other important interventions and 
distortions—for example, the pervasiveness of public-owned enterprises in developing countries, which are 
against the interests of the powerful élites. Appendix I will provide a formal model for the observed 
distortions and interventions in developing countries based on the need to support non-viable firms arising 
from the conflicts between the CAD strategy pursued by the government and the given endowment 
structure in the economy. However, once the government introduces a distortion, a group of vested interests 
will be created even if the distortion is created for noble purpose. The vested-interest argument could be 
appropriate for explaining the difficulty of removing distortions.   31
economy, the goal of a government’s development strategy should be to upgrade the 
endowment structure—instead of upgrading industry and technology directly without 
taking measures to upgrade their endowment structure first. Once the endowment 
structure is upgraded, relative factor prices will change and the profit motive and 
competition pressures will force enterprises to upgrade their industrial and technological 
structures spontaneously.  
 
Upgrading the endowment structure requires capital to accumulate faster than the growth 
of labour and natural resources; this applies to material capital and human capital. Capital 
accumulation depends on the total economic surplus and savings in the economy. If the 
development of industries and the adoption of technology in a developing country follow 
the comparative advantage determined by its endowment structure at every phase of 
development, the industries will be most competitive in the domestic and world markets 
at all times.
19  As a result, products will acquire the largest possible market share and 
generate the largest possible surplus. Since the capital investment has acquired the largest 
possible return, the returns on savings will also be the highest possible. Consequently, 
households will have the highest savings propensity, resulting in the fastest possible 
upgrade of the endowment structure. I will refer to the set of policies that facilitates the 
development of industries and the adoption of technology in a developing country to 
follow the comparative advantage determined by its endowment structure at every phase 
of development as a comparative advantage-following (CAF) strategy.  
                                                        
19 Porter (1990) makes the term ‘competitive advantage’ popular. According to him, a nation will have 
competitive advantage in the global economy if the industries in the nation fulfill the following four 
conditions: 1. their production intensively uses the nation’s abundant and relatively inexpensive factors of 
production, 2. their products have large domestic markets, 3. each industry forms domestic clusters and 4. 
markets are competitive. The first condition in effect means that the industries should be the economy’s 
comparative advantage determined by the nations’ endowments. The third and the fourth conditions will 
hold only if all industries are consistent with the nation’s competitive advantage. Therefore, the four 
conditions can be reduced to independent conditions: the comparative advantage and domestic market size. 
Among these two independent conditions, the comparative advantage is more important than the domestic 
market size because if an industry is the nation’s comparative advantage, the industry’s product will have a 
global market.  This is the reason why among the richest countries in the world, many of them are very 
small.   32
 
An enterprise’s selection of industry and technology depends on the relative prices of 
capital, labour and natural resources. Only when relative prices fully reflect the relative 
scarcity of these production factors will the enterprise’s selection be consistent with the 
comparative advantage determined by the endowment structure. This requires that the 
product and factor markets be fully competitive. Since markets in developing countries 
are usually not fully competitive, the adoption of a CAF strategy requires the government 
to improve various market institutions so as to create and protect effective competition in 
the product and factor markets—as advocated by Smith (1776), Marshall (1920) and 
recently by Bauer (1984), Lal (1983) and Little (1982).  
 
The government in a developing country could, however, play a more active role than 
just maintaining market competition. When the government follows a CAF strategy, as 
capital accumulates, the endowment structure will upgrade, causing the relative factor 
prices to change. Enterprises need to upgrade their industries and technologies 
accordingly in order to maintain market competitiveness. In the process, enterprises in 
developing countries can fully utilise the industrial and technological gap with developed 
countries and acquire industrial and technological innovations that are consistent with 
their new comparative advantage through learning and borrowing from developed 
countries, especially from those countries whose stage of development is higher than but 
not too far away from theirs.
20 Compared with innovation through independent research 
                                                        
20  This is one of the most important principles for the successful application of the advantage of 
backwardness. Historically, for those countries relying successfully on the advantage of backwardness to 
achieve industrialisation—that is, the continental countries in Western Europe in the nineteenth century and 
the Asian NIEs after World War II—they all borrowed technology from countries whose per capita income 
was not too much greater than theirs. In such circumstances, the borrowed technology will be consistent 
with the borrowing country’s comparative advantage and the enterprises using the borrowed technology 
will be viable. According to the estimations of Maddison (2006), the per capita incomes of the continental 
countries in Western Europe were about 60 per cent of that of the United Kingdom in 1870. Similarly, in 
post-World War II development, the four East Asian NIEs borrowed technology from Japan instead of 
North America and Western Europe. In addition, the technology and industry transferred from Japan to the 
East Asian NIEs followed a flying-goose pattern in the initial stage (Akamatsu, 1962)—that is, industrial 
development in the East Asian NIEs followed one step behind the Japanese industries (Kim, 1988). For the   33
in developed countries, such acquisition of innovation has a lower cost and less risk. The 
speed of technological innovation will therefore be faster in the developing country that 
adopts a CAF strategy than in the developed country.
21 
 
In the above discussions, I assume that the information about the product markets, industries 
and production technologies is available freely to the firms in the economy.
22 When the 
factor-endowment structure of the economy is upgraded, therefore, the enterprises can 
upgrade their technologies or upgrade smoothly from a less capital-intensive industry to a 
relatively more capital-intensive industry. Such information might not, however, be 
available; therefore, it is necessary to invest resources to search for, collect and analyse the 
industry, product and technology information. If an enterprise carries out the activities on its 
own, it will keep the information private, and other enterprises will be required to make the 
same investment to obtain the information. There will be repetition in the information 
investment. The information does, however, have a public goods aspect. After the 
information has been gathered and processed, the cost of its dissemination is close to zero. 
The government can, therefore, collect the information about the new industries, markets 
and technology and make it available to all firms in the form of an industrial policy. 
 
The upgrading of technology and industry often requires coordination of different 
enterprises and sectors in the economy. For example, the human capital or skill requirements 
                                                                                                                                                                     
poorer countries in Eastern Europe—such as Hungary and Russia—whose per capita income was about 30 
per cent of that of the United Kingdom in 1870, an attempt similar to that by Western European countries in 
the late nineteenth century resulted in a much higher degree of government intervention and direct 
involvement, causing various difficulties and economic stagnation after the industries were established 
(Gershenkron, 1962). When borrowing technology from advanced countries, however, developing 
countries often aim for the most advanced technology.  
21 The above discussion does not mean that a country that follows a CAF strategy does not need to engage 
in indigenous innovation. To be successful, the country needs to undertake process innovation to make the 
borrowed technology suitable to local conditions. The country also needs to do indigenous product 
innovation in sectors in which the country has already been the world leader or has been just a step behind 
the world leader. For further discussions, see Lin and Ren (2007). 
22  The next six paragraphs on the government’s role in overcoming information, coordination and 
externality issues are drawn from Lin (2003).   34
of new industries/technologies might be different from those used with older 
industries/technologies. An enterprise might not be able to internalise the supply of the new 
requirements and will need to rely on outside sources; therefore, the success of a firm’s 
industry/technology upgrade depends also on the existence of an outside supply of new 
human capital. In addition to human capital, the firms that are upgrading might require 
support for new financial institutions, trading arrangements, marketing and distribution 
facilities, intellectual property rights protection and so on. The government might, therefore, 
also use industrial policy to coordinate firms in different industries and sectors for the 
upgrading of industry/technology in the economy.
23  Developing countries generally lag 
behind in their infrastructure, financial institutions, legal systems and other social 
development, so the government needs also to invest in the infrastructure and strengthen the 
development of legal, financial and social institutions along with the industrial upgrading. 
The government needs also to build up its administrative capacity in order to carry out the 
above functions. 
 
The upgrading of industry/technology is an innovation, and it is risky by nature. Even with 
the information and coordination provided by the government’s industry policy, an 
enterprise’s attempt to upgrade its industry/technology might fail due to the upgrade being 
too ambitious, the new market being too small, the coordination being simply inadequate 
and so on. The failure will indicate to other firms that the targets of the industrial policy are 
not appropriate, and, therefore, they can avoid that failure by not following the policy. That 
is, the first enterprise pays the cost of failure and produces valuable information for other 
enterprises. If the first enterprise succeeds, the success will provide externalities to other 
enterprises, prompting them to engage in similar upgrades. These subsequent upgrades will 
                                                        
23 Most ‘big-push’ attempts by the less-developed countries (LDCs) in the 1950s and 1960s failed. There 
has, however, been renewed interest in the idea since the influential articles by Murphy et al. (1989). Their 
paper showed that government coordination and support were required for setting up a key industry and 
that the demand spill-overs from the key industry to other industries would enhance economic growth. For 
the big-push strategy to be successful, the ‘pushed’ industry must be consistent with the comparative 
advantage—which is determined by the relative factor endowment of the economy—and the firms in the 
pushed industry must be viable after the push. Deviation from comparative advantage in the pushed 
industries and the consequent lack of viability of the chosen firms are the reasons why so many big-push 
attempts by LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s failed.   35
dissipate the possible rents that the first enterprise might enjoy, so there is an asymmetry 
between the costs of failure and the gains of success that the pioneer enterprise might have. 
To compensate for the externality and the asymmetry between the possible costs and gains, 
the government could provide some form of subsidy—such as tax incentives or loan 
guarantees—to the enterprises that initially follow the government’s industrial policy. 
 
As many studies of the success stories of the East Asian NIEs suggest, it is therefore 
desirable for the government to have an industrial policy to overcome the information, 
coordination and externality problems that are unavoidable in the process of development 
(Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Wade, 1990). It is worthwhile noting, however, that there is a 
fundamental difference between the industrial policy of a CAF strategy and that of a CAD 
strategy. The promoted industry/technology in the CAF strategy is consistent with the 
comparative advantage determined by changes in the economy’s factor endowments, 
whereas the priority industry/technology that the CAD strategy attempts to promote is not 
consistent with comparative advantage. The enterprises in the CAF strategy should therefore 
be viable after they are established with the government’s help in information and 
coordination, and a small, limited subsidy should be enough to compensate for the 
externality issue. In contrast, enterprises following a CAD strategy are not viable and their 
survival depends on large, continuous policy favours/support from the government.
24 
 
A comparison of the successes and failures of industrial policies for automobile production 
in Japan, Korea, India and China is a good illustration of the differences between the CAF 
and CAD industrial policies. The automobile industry is a typical capital-intensive heavy 
                                                        
24  The dynamic comparative advantage is another argument often used for the government’s industrial 
policy and support to firms (Redding, 1999). In my framework, however, it can be seen clearly that the 
argument is valid only if the government’s support is limited to overcoming information and coordination 
costs and the pioneering firm’s externality to other firms. The industry should be consistent with the 
comparative advantage of the economy and the firms in the new industry should be viable, otherwise the 
firms will collapse once the government’s support is removed. The required lengthy support to the firms for 
the dynamic comparative advantage will crowd out the resources available to other firms that are consistent 
with the competitive advantage of the economy and slow economic growth and capital accumulation. The 
economy will therefore reach the stage targeted by the dynamic-advantage policy later than an economy 
that follows a CAF strategy.   36
industry. The development of an automobile industry is the dream of most developing 
countries. Japan adopted an industrial policy to promote its automobile industry in the mid-
1960s and achieved great success. Japan’s experience is cited often as a supporting 
argument by advocates of an industrial policy for heavy industries in developing countries. 
South Korea instituted an industrial policy for automobile production in the mid-1970s and 
has achieved a limited degree of success. The automobile industries in China and India were 
started in the 1950s, and in both countries required continuous government protection 30 
years after their establishment (Maxcy, 1981). What can explain why a similar industrial 
policy yields success in one instance and failure in another? This will be clear once we 
compare the per capita income of these countries with the per capita income of the United 
States at the time when the former initiated their policies (Table VI.1).  
 
Table VI.1 Level of per capita income (1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) 
  United States  Japan  South Korea India  China 
1955 10,970  2,695 1,197 665 818 
1965 14,017  5,771 1,578 785 945 
1975  16,060 10,973 3,475  900  1,250 
Source:  Maddison, A. (1995). Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 196–205. 
 
Per capita income is a good proxy for the relative abundance of capital and labour in an 
economy. Capital is abundant and wage rates are high in a high-income country. In a low-
income country, the opposite holds true. Table 1 indicates that when Japan initiated its 
automobile-production policy in the mid-1960s, its per capita income was more than 40 per 
cent of that in the United States. The automobile industry was not the most advanced, 
capital-intensive industry at that time nor was Japan a capital-scarce economy. The Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) gave support only to Nissan and Toyota; 
however, more than 10 firms—ignoring the MITI’s prompting not to enter the industry—
also started automobile production and were successful, even though they did not receive 
any support from the MITI. As those firms did not receive government support and were 
successful in open, competitive markets, this evidence indicates that the Japanese   37
automobile firms were viable, upgrading of the automobile industry reflected the upgrading 
in Japan’s endowment structure and the MITI’s promotion of the automobile industry in the 
1960s was consistent with the requirement of a CAF strategy. When South Korea initiated 
its automobile-industry development policy in the 1970s, its per capita income was about 
only 20 per cent of that of the United States and about 30 per cent of that of Japan. This 
could explain why the South Korean government needed to give its automobile firms much 
greater and longer support than the Japanese government did. Even despite the support, two 
of the three automobile firms in South Korea fell into bankruptcy. When China and India 
initiated their automobile-industry development policies in the 1950s, their per capita 
incomes were less than 10 per cent of that of the United States. The automobile firms in 




In short, a developing-country government that follows a CAF strategy needs, on the one 
hand, to build up and maintain competitive market institutions so that the relative factor 
                                                        
25 Similarly, Bismarck’s industrialisation push did not cause Germany to be caught in the Listian trap, but 
other developing countries could not escape this trap when they adopted the same set of policies to boost 
their development of capital-intensive heavy industries (Hayami and Goto, 2005, Ch. 8). As discussed in 
Footnote 19, the difference is attributable to the fact that in 1870 GDP per capita in Germany was $1,821—
measured in 1990 international dollars—which was 57 per cent of Britain’s per capita GDP of $3,191 
(Maddison, 2006, p. 264). Compared with the gap between the developed and the developing countries in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the gap between Germany and Britain (the most advanced country at that time) was 
relatively small. Bismarck’s industrial policy was, therefore, consistent with the requirement of a CAF 
strategy. Philosophically, the success of the iron and steel policies in Bismarck’s Germany and the 
automobile-industry policy in Japan in the 1960s—and the failure of industrial policies in most other 
developing countries—are good examples of the maxim that ‘quantity difference leads to quality 
difference’. The industrial policies of Bismarck and Japan’s MITI were CAF strategies to overcome the 
information, coordination and externality problems arising from industrial upgrading, according to the 
requirements of their factor endowments. The best proof is that once the industries were set up in Germany 
and Japan, their products could compete effectively in international markets without further government 
subsidisation and protection. Although the industries targeted in other developing countries were similar to 
those in Germany and Japan, due to their low endowment structures, their industrial policies were in the 
nature of a CAD strategy. Even after the industries were set up, their survival depended on continuous 
government protection and subsidisation.   38
prices will reflect the changes in the relative abundance of factor endowments in the 
economy so as to guide the enterprises to make appropriate choices and upgrade industry 
and technology dynamically. On the other hand, the government needs to play an active 
role in collecting and disseminating technology and industry information plausibly in the 
form of industrial policy, in coordinating the enterprises’ investment, compensating for 
externalities, and in strengthening legal, financial and social institutions to facilitate the 
enterprises’ upgrading of industry and technology. If the developing-country government 
plays the right roles, the country can benefit from the advantage of backwardness and is 
able to upgrade its endowment, industrial and technological structures more rapidly than 
a developed country. Lin and Zhang (2007) show that in the end the income level of this 
developing country will converge successfully to that of the developed countries.
26  
 
Unlike the adoption of a CAD strategy—which will worsen income distribution, as 
discussed previously—the adoption of a CAF strategy could improve income distribution 
in the dynamic development process. When the economy’s development is in its early 
stage—with relatively abundant labour and scarce capital—enterprises will initially enter 
                                                        
26 To implement the above functions, the government needs to have substantial capacity; therefore, once the 
governments of countries such as India, China, Japan and the NIEs in East Asia change their ideas of 
development and perform an appropriate role, the countries can take off quickly. This could be the reason 
why Chanda and Putterman (2007) find that old states such as China and India have been experiencing 
more rapid economic growth in recent decades: most developing countries lag behind developed countries 
not only in industry and technology, but in legal, financial and social institutions and state capacity. In 
addition to overcoming the coordination failure in investment, therefore, it is imperative for the government 
to play an active role in supporting social, economic and political institutional development along with 
economic development. My view on the government’s role is similar to that of proponents of the 
development-state theory. For a recent review of development-state theory, see the article by Fritz and 
Menocal (2007) and 10 articles in Development Policy Review, Volume 25, No. 5 (September 2007). The 
term ‘developmental state’ could cause some confusion because the government that adopts a CAD 
strategy also does that for the purpose of national development. As Lewis (1955, p. 376) observed, 
‘[G]overnments may fail either because they do too little, or because they do too much.’ If the government 
in a developing country follows the teaching of minimum state and does not play an active role in the 
development of industry, markets and institutions—as required by a CAF strategy—it is doing too little. If, 
however, the government adopts a CAD strategy, it is doing too much.   39
labour-intensive industries and adopt more labour-intensive technologies. This will create 
as many employment opportunities as possible and will transfer labour from traditional 
sectors to modernised manufacturing sectors. Accompanied with an upgrade in the 
endowment structure, labour abundance will be replaced gradually with labour scarcity 
and capital scarcity will gradually become capital abundance. Accordingly, the cost of 
labour will increase and the cost of capital will decrease. Because capital income is the 
major source of income for the rich, while labour is the major source of income for the 
poor, such changes in relative prices will make it possible to achieve simultaneously 
economic development and equity (Lin and Liu, 2007).
27. 
 
Moreover, a country that follows a CAF strategy will be more outward-oriented than a 
country that follows a CAD strategy. The CAF country will develop and export goods in 
which it has comparative advantages and import the goods in which it does not have 
comparative advantage. On the contrary, the CAD country will attempt to produce goods 
in which it does not have comparative advantages and imports will be reduced; 
meanwhile, its exports will also be reduced due to the relocation of resources away from 
sectors that are consistent with its comparative advantages to sectors violating its 
comparative advantages. From the above comparison, the degree of openness to trade is 
endogenous to the government’s development strategy. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
trade is a fundamental determinant of growth in a country could just reflect the fact that 
the successful countries are following the comparative advantages in their economic 
development.
28 
                                                        
27 The above argument does not belittle the government’s role in achieving an equitable income distribution. 
For example: the government needs to provide minimum living support to disabled and temporarily 
unemployed people as well as investing in education and vocational training to assist labourers to meet job 
requirements. If, however, all able-bodied labourers are employed, it will be much easier for the 
government to achieve an equitable society than otherwise. 
28 The above discussion assumes that a country relies on its own capital for investment. The existence of 
international capital flow will not change the main conclusions. International capital could come to a 
developing country in two ways: by borrowing or direct investment. If the government borrows capital to 
invest in infrastructure or in industries that are consistent with the economy’s comparative advantages, the 
capital inflow will benefit the economy’s growth. If capital is borrowed to invest in sectors that are against   40
 
V.  
Viability and strategies of transition 
No matter it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it can catch mouse it is a good cat. 




In a country that adopts a CAD strategy, it is likely that in the early stage, the economy 
will enjoy a period of rapid investment-driven growth. As has been observed, however, in 
Latin America and many other developing and socialist countries, economic growth will 
inevitably slow down, leading to eventual stagnation and even frequent crises due to the 
depletion of economic surplus, which is required for investment arising from the 
misallocation of resources, suppression of incentives, soft-budget constraints and rent-
seeking activities.  
  
As predicted by the hypothesis of Schultz (1977) about the interaction of social thought 
and institutions, the malfunctioning of established institutions in the CAD strategy in turn 
alters social thinking about the role of government in economic development. Since the 
late 1970s, a new social thinking has arisen: Wiles (1995) labels it ‘capitalist 
triumphalism’ and its policies are encapsulated in the package of 10 policy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
comparative advantages—whether it is borrowed by the government or by the private sector—a period of 
investment-led growth could be prolonged, but the poor performance will not change and the economy 
could encounter crisis when it is time to repay the foreign debt. Foreign capital could come also as direct 
investment, for which there could be two possible purposes: to use the developing country as an export 
production base or to penetrate into the developing country’s domestic markets. Investment for the former 
will be in sectors that are consistent with the country’s comparative advantages; for the latter, the goods 
produced by the foreign-owned firms will be more advanced and capital-intensive than those produced by 
domestic firms. To reduce production costs, however, the foreign-owned firms will substitute the capital 
with low-cost local labour to the extent that the technology permits. Therefore, the capital intensity of the 
foreign subsidiary in a developing country will be lower than that in the home, developed country. 
29 Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) was the leader who led China to transit from a planned economy to a market 
economy  in 1979 by following a piece-meal, tinkering, gradual approach without a blue print.    41
recommendations in the ‘Washington Consensus’—a term coined by Williamson 
(1989).
30  The main idea of the Washington Consensus is to eliminate government 
intervention and distortion so as to create a private property-based open, competitive 
market economy. The shock therapy that was promoted to Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union for their transition to a market economy was a version of the Washington 
Consensus.  
 
Economists are known to have diverse views on practically all issues, however, as 
Summers (1994) writes, when it comes to reforming a socialist economy, there is a 
surprising consensus among mainstream economists for adopting shock therapy.
31 One 
element of shock therapy is the need for rapid privatisation. Arguments for this are as 
follows: private ownership is the foundation for a well-functioning market system, real 
market competition requires a real private sector (Sachs and Lipton, 1990), most 
problems encountered by state-owned enterprises in a transitional economy can be 
ameliorated by rapid privatisation (Sachs, 1992) and privatisation must take place before 
state-owned enterprises can be restructured (Blanchard et al., 1991).
32 Another  early 
consensus view for transition is the need for total big-bang price liberalisation. An 
influential article by Murphy et al. (1992) attributed the fall in outputs in the Soviet 
                                                        
30 The package of policies includes fiscal discipline, redirection of public spending from indiscriminate 
subsidies towards broad-based provision of pro-growth, poverty-alleviating services, broadening the tax 
base, interest rate liberalisation, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, uniform tariffs, 
liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment, privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation of market 
entry, prudent oversight of financial institutions and legal protection of property rights. 
31 Certainly, a few economists had dissenting views: Stiglitz was a notable example. In his book Wither 
Socialism?, Stiglitz  (1994) questioned the desirability of privatisation and other basic tenets of the 
Washington Consensus. 
32  There were some economists arguing for an evolutional, gradual approach to privatisation in the 
transition. For example, Kornai (1990) argues that private property rights cannot be made to work by fiat in 
the transitional economies where entire generations are forced to forget the civic principles and values 
associated with private ownership and private rights, and become a mere imitation of the most refined legal 
and business forms of the leading capitalist countries. Kornai also believes, however, that private ownership 
is the foundation for a well-functioning market system and privatisation is the only way to eliminate state-
owned enterprises’ soft-budget constraints.   42
Union in 1990–91 to partial price liberalisation. They argue that a dual-track pricing 
system will encourage arbitrage, corruption, rent seeking and diversion of scarce inputs 
from high-value to low-value use. The last element in shock therapy is the need to tighten 
the government’s fiscal discipline to maintain macroeconomic stability so that prices can 
serve as a guide for resource allocation and the market mechanism can work well. 
 
The three integral constituents of shock therapy—like the 10 policy recommendations of 
the Washington Consensus—are logically consistent and the arguments to support them 
are persuasive. Proponents expected that the simultaneous implementation of price 
liberalisation, rapid privatisation and fiscal discipline would allow the countries to 
experience a ‘J-curve’ in their growth path—that is, a short-term transition recession 
followed by a quick and dynamic growth rebound after implementing the package of 
reforms. As shown in Figure I.3, however, the transitional economies in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union encountered deep recessions. For the Eastern European 
economies, their per capita income levels did not recover until 2000 to the levels 
experienced before the transition in 1990; and, for the economies in the former Soviet 
Union, they have still not recovered.
33 Other developing countries under the guidance of 
the IMF followed the Washington Consensus package of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s 
and their economic performance was also disappointing (Barro, 1998; Easterly, 2001). 
Because of the failure of the Washington Consensus reforms to bring about rapid 
economic development and to eradicate poverty in Latin America, there has been a 
resurgence of socialist ideology in there and in South America in recent years and some 
governments have decided to re-nationalise or to take majority shares in some privatised 
enterprises (Ishmael, 2007). 
 
China, Vietnam and other East Asian transitional economies did not follow the 
                                                        
33 Slovenia is an exception in Eastern Europe. It has enjoyed rapid growth in its transition to a market 
economy. Slovenia joined the European Union in May 2004 and the Eurozone on 1 January 2007. Slovenia 
did not, however, practice shock therapy. In addition to its excellent infrastructure, a well-educated 
workforce and an excellent central location, its privatisation did not gain momentum until 2002–05. 
Similarly, Poland—the other best performer in Eastern Europe—did not start to privatise its large state-
owned enterprises until recently.   43
Washington Consensus and adopted a dual-track, gradual approach—referred to by some 
economists as an ‘Asian approach’ (Rana and Hamid, 1995; Chang and Noland, 1995). In 
China, for example, instead of rapid privatisation of its state-owned enterprises, the 
government continued its ownership of the enterprises and gave them subsidies through 
preferential access to subsidised credit. It also allowed private enterprises—including 
joint ventures—to enter the previously suppressed sectors (Perkins, 1998). This approach 
was once asserted to be the worst possible transition strategy—one that would invite rent 
seeking and corruption and result in unavoidable economic collapse (Sachs et al., 
2000).
34 Likewise, most state-owned enterprises in Vietnam have not been privatised and 
still enjoy priority access to subsidised bank credits (Sun, 1997). Instead of collapsing, 
China has been the most dynamic economy in the world in the past three decades. It has 
moved close to becoming a fully fledged market economy (Naughton, 1996) and to 
achieving the ideal Pareto improvement result of reform without losers (Lau et al., 2000; 
Lin et al., 1996). Similarly, Vietnam’s economy has been very dynamic since the start of 
its transition in the early 1980s. 
 
Why has the Washington Consensus failed? Again, what’s wrong is not the goal of setting 
up an open, competitive market system but the failure to recognise the endogenous nature 
of the distortions in the economic system before transition. 
 
The objectives of the Washington Consensus reforms are to eliminate government 
distortions and interventions in socialist and developing countries and to set up a well-
functioning market system. If this goal is realised, market competition will determine the 
relative prices of various products and production factors and the relative prices will 
reflect their relative scarcities in factor endowments. Given these prices, market 
competition will induce enterprises to choose industries, products and technology that are 
                                                        
34 Sachs and Woo (1994) attributed the remarkable growth rate during China’s transition process to its large 
rural labour force, which could be reallocated to high-value manufacturing industries. Mongolia and many 
transitional economies in central Asia also have a large rural labour pool; however, unlike China, they did 
not have a dynamic growth performance in the transitional process, but encountered a collapse similar to 
that in the more industrialised former Soviet states.   44
consistent with the comparative advantages determined by the economy’s endowment 
structure. Consequently, the economy will be able to make full utilisation of the 
advantage of backwardness, and will prosper.  
 
What the Washington Consensus ignores, however, is that in a country that adopts a CAD 
strategy, there exist many non-viable enterprises. Without government protection and 
subsidisation, they are unable to survive in an open and competitive market. If there are 
only limited numbers of such non-viable enterprises, the output value and employment in 
them will be limited; shock therapy that eliminates all government intervention at once 
could be applicable. With the abolition of government protection and subsidisation, these 
non-viable enterprises will become bankrupt. The originally suppressed labour-intensive 
industries will, however, thrive, and the newly created employment opportunities in these 
industries could surpass the losses from the non-viable firms. As a result, the economy 
could recover quickly from the bankruptcies of the non-viable firms.  
 
On the other hand, if the number of non-viable firms is too large, their output value and 
employment make up too large a share in the national economy and shock therapy is 
inapplicable. Its application will result in economic chaos due to large-scale bankruptcies 
and dramatic increases in unemployment. In order to avoid such dramatic increases in 
unemployment or to sustain these ‘advanced’ non-viable enterprises, the government has 
no choice but to continue its protection and subsidisation for these firms—either 
explicitly or implicitly—in a more disguised way than the previous distortions: that is, 
changing the previous second-best distortions to even worse third or fourth-best 
distortions. Even if the firms are privatised, soft-budget constraint problems will continue. 
The subsidies to the non-viable firms could even increase due to the private owners 
having greater incentives to lobby for subsidies and protection (Lin and Li, forthcoming). 
In effect, this is what happened in Russia and many other countries in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union (Brada, 1996; Frydman et al., 1996; Lavigne, 1995; Pleskovic, 
1994; Stark, 1996; Sun, 1997; World Bank, 2002a). In the end, the economy could find 
itself in an awkward situation of shock without therapy (Kolodko, 2000).
35 
                                                        
35  The difference in the shares of non-viable firms in the economy might explain why the shock   45
 
Facing the endogenously formed distortions and the existence of large-scale non-viable 
enterprises in the economy, the dual-track gradual approach adopted by the Chinese 
government is arguably better than shock therapy (McKinnon, 1993). First, the Chinese 
government adopted a ‘micro’ approach to improve incentives for farmers and state-
owned enterprise workers by adopting the individual household-based farming system to 
replace the collective farming system and introduced profit-retention and managerial 
autonomy to state-owned enterprises, making farmers and workers partial residual 
claimants. This reform greatly improved the incentives and productivity in agriculture 
and industry (Grove et al., 1994; Jefferson et al., 1992; Jefferson and Rawski, 1995; Lin, 
1992; Li, 1997; Weitzman and Xu, 1995). Second, the government allowed the private 
enterprises, joint ventures, state-owned enterprises and collective township and village 
enterprises to use the resources under their control to invest in labour-intensive industries 
that had been suppressed in the past. Meanwhile, the government required farmers and 
state-owned enterprises to fulfil their obligations to deliver certain quotas of products to 
the State at preset prices. The former reform improved the efficiency of resource 
allocation and the latter ensured the government’s ability to continue subsidising the non-
viable firms. Therefore, economic stability and dynamic growth were achieved 
simultaneously.  
 
Finally, with the shrinking of the state-owned enterprises’ share in the economy during 
the dynamic growth path, the government gradually eliminated price distortions and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
therapy recommended by Sachs succeeded in Bolivia but not in the economies of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. Bolivia is a poor, small economy; therefore, the resources that the 
government could mobilise to subsidise the non-viable firms were small and the share of non-viable 
firms in the economy was also relatively small. Stiglitz (1998) questioned the universal applicability 
of the Washington Consensus. He pointed out that it advocated use of a small set of instruments—
including macroeconomic stability, liberalised trade and privatisation—to achieve a relatively narrow 
goal of economic growth. He encouraged governments to use a broader set of instruments—such as 
financial regulations and competition policy—to achieve a broader set of goals, including sustainable 
development, equity of income distribution and so on. How to deal with the issue of non-viable firms 
in developing and transitional economies and the implications for policy choices were not discussed.   46
administrative allocation and privatised the small and medium-sized enterprises—most of 
which were in the labour-intensive sectors (Lin et al., 1994, 1996; Naughton, 1995; Nolan, 
1995; Qian, 2003). Although there was no mass privatisation and the property rights of 
the collective township and village enterprises were ambiguous, market competition 
increased and economic performance was improved (Li, 1996; Lin et al., 1998).  
 
The transitional strategy in Vietnam is similar to that employed in China. Through this 
cautious and gradual approach, China and Vietnam have been able to replace their 
traditional Soviet-type systems with a market system while maintaining remarkable 
records of growth and price stability.  
 
Incidentally, Mauritius has since the 1970s also adopted a dual-track approach to open up 
its CAD strategy-type import-substitution economy. It set up export-processing zones to 
encourage exports and maintained import restrictions to protect non-viable enterprises in 
domestic import-competing sectors. This reform strategy saw Mauritian GDP grow at 5.9 
per cent per annum between 1973 and 1999—an exceptional success story in Africa 
(Rodrik, 1999; Subramanian and Roy, 2003).    47
VI 
Development Strategy and Development and Transition 
Performances: Empirical Analysis 
The previous sections discussed the effects of development strategy on institutional 
arrangements, economic growth, income distribution and transition performance in a 
country. From those discussions, I derive several testable hypotheses.  
 
1  A country that adopts a CAD strategy will require various government 
interventions and distortions in its economy. 
2  Over an extended period, a country that adopts a CAD strategy will have 
poor growth performance.  
3  Over an extended period, a country that adopts a CAD strategy will have a 
volatile economy. 
4  Over an extended period, a country that adopts a CAD strategy will have less 
equitable income distribution.  
5  In the transition to a market economy, a country’s overall economic growth 
will be improved if it creates conditions to facilitate the development of 
formerly repressed labour-intensive industries. 
 
This section will report the results of empirical testing of the above hypotheses, some of 
which were conducted by myself and my co-authors in previous studies.  
 
VI.1. Proxy for development strategy 
In order to test the above hypotheses, a proxy for a country’s development strategy is 
required. Lin and Liu (2004) propose a technology choice index (TCI) as a proxy for the 










=  (1) 
where  , it AVM  is the added value of manufacturing industries of country i  at time t ; 
, it GDP   is the total added value of country i  at  time  t ;  , it LM  is the labour in the 
manufacturing industry and  , it L  is the total labour force. If a government adopts a CAD 
strategy to promote its capital-intensive industries, the TCI in this country is expected to 
be larger than otherwise. This is because if a country adopts a CAD strategy, in order to 
overcome the viability issue of the firms in the prioritised sectors of the manufacturing 
industries, the government might give the firms monopoly positions in the product 
markets—allowing them to charge higher output prices—and provide them with 
subsidised credits and inputs to lower their investment and operation costs. The above 
policy measures will result in a larger  , it AVM  than otherwise. Meanwhile, investment in 
the manufacturing industry will be more capital intensive and absorb less labour—ceteris 
paribus. The nominator in Equation 1 will therefore be larger for a country that adopts a 
CAD strategy. As such, given the income level and other conditions, the magnitude of the 
TCI can be used as a proxy for the extent that a CAD strategy is pursued in a country.
36 
The data for calculating the TCI are taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators  (2002) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation’s 
International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics (2002). The means and variations of the 
TCI for each of the 122 countries in the period 1962–99 are reported in the Appendix II. 
 
VI.2. Development strategy and institutions 
To assess the effects of development strategy on the government’s distortions and 
interventions in the economy—as postulated in Hypothesis 1—I use several proxies for 
the institutions: 1) the ‘black-market premium’ is used as an index of price distortion; 2) 
                                                        
36 Lin (2003) constructs another index—based on the ratio of capital intensity in the manufacturing industry 
and the capital intensity in the whole economy—as a proxy for measuring the degree with which a CAD 
strategy is pursued. That proxy is correlated highly with the current proxy and the results of empirical 
analyses based on that proxy are similar to the results reported in this section. The data for capital used in a 
country’s manufacturing industry are, however, available for only a small number of countries. To enlarge 
the number of countries in the studies, I therefore use the proxy based on the added value of manufacturing 
industries as defined in Equation 1 in this section.   49
the index of economic freedom (IEF) and the expropriation risk are used as indices of 
government intervention; 3) the number of procedures required for a start-up firm to obtain 
legal status and the ‘executive de facto independence’ are used as indices of enterprise 
autonomy; and 4) the trade dependence ratio is used as an index for openness. The means 
and variations of each proxy for each country are reported in the Appendix. 
 
VI.2.1 Development strategy and price distortion 
The black-market premium of 105 countries is adopted from the Global Development 
Network Growth Database provided by the Development Research Institute of New York 
University. The relationship between the TCI and the black-market premium across four 
decades (1960–69, 1970–79, 1980–89, 1990–99) is shown in Figure VI.1. 
 
Figure VI.1 The TCI and black-market premium 
 
 





































































The above graphs show that the TCI and the black-market premium had positive   50
relationships throughout the four decades, which implies—as predicted by Hypothesis 
1—that a higher degree of CAD strategy is associated with a larger black-market 
premium.  
 
VI. 2.2 Development strategy and government intervention in resource allocation 
To measure government intervention, I use the index of economic freedom (IEF) and the 
expropriation risk. The observations of IEF from 91 countries are adopted from Economic 
Freedom of the World (Fraser Institute, 2007), which are available from 1970 onwards. 
This index ranges from zero to 10. A higher value means a higher degree of economic 
freedom. The correlations between the TCI and the IEF averaged across a decade for each 
country are shown in Figure VI.2. 
 
Figure VI.2 The TCI and the IEF 














































There is a strong negative relationship between the TCI and the IEF in each of the above 
panels, which is consistent with the prediction that the more aggressive a government   51
pursues a CAD strategy, the more government invention is required, and the less 
economic freedom there is.  
 
The expropriation risk of 102 countries is adopted from the International Country Risk 
Guide. The expropriation risk is the risk of outright confiscation and forced 
nationalisation of property. This variable ranges from zero to 10. A higher value means 
that a private enterprise has a lower probability of being expropriated. Figure VI.3 plots 
the relationship between the TCI and the expropriation risk. Both variables are calculated 
as the average values from 1982 until 1997.  
 
Figure VI.3 The TCI and expropriation risk 
  
As shown, there is a negative relationship between the TCI and expropriation risk, which 
is consistent with the expectation that the more aggressive a government adopts a CAD 
strategy, the more likely it is that the government will confiscate or nationalise an 
enterprise.   
 
VI.2.3 Development strategy and enterprise autonomy 
To analyse the relationship between the government’s development strategy and enterprise 
autonomy, the study uses two indexes—including the number of procedures and the 
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executive de facto independence used in Djankov et al. (2002)—to represent the extent of 
enterprise autonomy. There are 69 countries in the samples. 
 
The ‘number of procedures’ is the number of administrative procedures that a start-up firm 
has to comply with in order to obtain legal status—that is, to start operating as a legal entity. 
‘Executive de facto independence’ is an index of ‘operation (de facto) independence of the 
chief executive’, descending from 1 to 7 (1 = pure individual; 2 = intermediate category; 3 = 
slight to moderate limitations; 4 = intermediate category; 5 = substantial limitations; 6 = 
intermediate category; 7 = executive parity or subordination). Both indexes are the average 
values for the years from 1945 until 1998.  
 
Figure VI.4 The TCI and enterprise autonomy 






















The positive relationship between the TCI and the number of procedures and the negative 
relationship between the TCI and the executive de facto independence shown in Figure VI.4 
indicate that a high degree of CAD strategy is associated with low enterprise autonomy, 
which confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 1. 
 
VI.2.4 Development strategy and openness 
The trade-dependence ratio of 115 countries—taken from Dollar and Kraay (2003)—is 
used to reflect the openness of a country. The correlations between the TCI and openness 
averaged across the past four decades in each country are shown in Figure VI.4.
37 
                                                        
37 The samples are 86 for the 1960s, 97 for the 1970s, 107 for the 1980s and 114 for the 1990s.   53
 
Figure VI.4 The TCI and openness 













































































We find that the TCI and openness have a negative relationship, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that if a developing-country government adopts a CAD strategy, its 
economy will become more inward-oriented than otherwise. This is because the CAD 
strategy attempts to substitute the import of capital-intensive manufactured goods with 
domestic production, causing a reduction in imports. Exports will also be suppressed due 
to the inevitable transfer of resources away from the industries that have comparative 
advantage to the prioritised sectors determined by the CAD strategy. The more a country 
follows a CAD strategy therefore, the less openness there will be in the country.  
 
VI.3. Development strategy and economic growth
38 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that over an extended period, a country adopting a CAD strategy 
will have a poor growth performance. The following econometric model is used to test 
the hypothesis: 
                                                        
38 Sections 3, 4 and 6 draw on Lin and Liu (2004).   54
,, it it GROWTH C TCI X α βξ =+ + + (2) 
where  , it GROWTH  is the economic growth rate in a certain period in country i, X is a 
vector that includes the initial per capita GDP to control the effect of the stage of 
development, the initial population size to control the effect of market size, the indicator 
of rule of law to reflect the institutional quality—which was constructed by Kaufmann et 
al. (2002)—the trade-dependent ratio to reflect openness, the distance from the Equator 
and whether the country is land-locked. The last two explanatory variables are included 
to capture the effects of geography. The instrumental variable for controlling the 
endogeneity of institutional quality is the share of population that speaks English and the 
share that speaks a major European language (Hall and Jones, 1999), which are used to 
capture the long-run impacts of colonial origin on current institutional quality. Similarly, 
the fitted values of trade predicted by a gravity model are used as the instrument for 
openness. This approach was proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999) and revised by 
Dollar and Kraay (2003). In the regressions that use panel data, the instrument for 
openness is the single-period lagged value of itself. Table VI.1 summarises the definition 
of each variable and the data source.  
 
Table VI.1 Variable definition and data source 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std 
dev. 
Sources 
LnGDP60  Log of real GDP per 
capita in 1960 
7.33   0.80  World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators 
LnGDP80  Log of real GDP per 
capita in 1980 
7.91   1.05  World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators 
LnGDP  Log of real GDP per 
capita in 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990 
7.73   1.02  World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators 
LnTCI1  Log of the average 
technology choice index 
from 1963 to 1999 




LnTCI2  Log of the average TCI 
per decade in 1960s, 
0.85       0.84  World Bank World 
Development   55
1970s, 1980s, 1990s  Indicators  and 
UNIDO (2002) 
LnTCI70  Log of the average TCI 
from 1970 to 1979. If not 
available, we use the log 
of the average TCI from 
1980 to 1985 
0.91   0.92  World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators (2002b) 
and UNIDO (2002) 
ΔTCI  Log of the average TCI 
from 1999 to 1990 minus 
LnTCI70 
0.07   0.38  World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators (2002b) 
and UNIDO (2002) 
RL01  Rule of law in 2000–01 
 
0.003 0.95  Kaufmann  et  al. 
(2002) 
LnOPEN1  Log of the average 
(exports + imports)/GDP 
from 1960 to 1999 
-1.11 0.81  Dollar,  and  Kraay 
(2003) 
LnOPEN2  Log of the decadal 
average (exports + 
imports)/GDP in 1960s, 
1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
-1.30  0.84  Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
LnPOP1  Log of the total mid-year 
population from 1960 to 
1999 
15.2   2.11  World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators(2002b) 
LnPOP2  Log of the total initial-
year population in 1960s, 
1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
14.93 2.12  World  Bank  World 
Development 
Indicators(2002b) 
LANDLOCK Dummy variable taking 
value of 1 if country is 
land-locked; 0 otherwise 
0.18    0.39  Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
LnDIST  Log (DISTEQ+1), where 
DISTEQ is the distance 
from Equator, measured 
as absolute value of 
latitude of capital city 
2.96  0.88  Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
ENGFRAC  Fraction of population 
speaking English  
0.07     0.24  Hall and Jones 
(1999), taken from 
Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
EURFRAC  Fraction of population 
speaking a major 
European language 
0.22    0.38  Hall and Jones 
(1999), taken from 
Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
LnFRINST Instrument  variable  for 
LnOPEN  
-2.83    0.64  Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
INST  Predicted value of RL01 
in the cross-section 
.003 .34     56
estimation (ENGFRAC 
and EURFRAC as the 
instruments) 
 
We will use two approaches to test this hypothesis. In the first approach, the dependent 
variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the period 1962–99, and 
in the second, the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP 
for each decade of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Table VI.2 reports the estimates from the first approach. Regression Model 1.1 and 
Model 1.2 use the OLS approach to obtain the estimates. The explanatory variables in 
Model 1.1 include only the proxy for the development strategy, LnTCI1, and the initial 
GDP per capita, LnGDP60, whereas Model 1.2 includes other explanatory variables that 
capture institutional quality, openness, geographic location and market size. Model 1.3 
has the same explanatory variables but the model uses the 2SLS approach in order to 
control the endogeneity of institutional quality and openness.  
 
The results show that the TCI has the expected negative effect and is highly significant in 
all three regressions. This finding supports Hypothesis 2 that the more aggressive is the 
CAD strategy pursued by a country, the worse the growth performance is in that country 
in the period 1962–99. The estimated coefficients of LnTCI1 have values ranging from –
0.66 to –1.25. From the estimates, we can infer that a 10 per cent increase from the mean 
in the TCI can result in approximately 0.1 of a percentage point reduction in the country’s 
average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the whole period 1962–99. 
 
The regression results also show that the initial per capita income and the population size 
have the expected signs and significant effects on the growth rate. Rule of law, openness 
and distance from the Equator also have the expected signs. Rule of law is not, however, 
significant in the 2SLS regression and distance from the Equator is not significant in the 
OLS regression. Whether the country is land-locked is insignificant in all three 
regressions. 
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Table VI.2 The impact of the production mode on economic growth
1 
























RL02   0.58*** 
(0.21) 
 
INST     0.22 
(0.41) 
LnOPEN2   0.70*** 
(0.22) 
 
TRADE2     0.93** 
(0.43) 













2  .36 0.56 0.44 
Observations 85  83  83 
1 dependent variable is the yearly average of per-capita GDP growth rate in 1962–99 
* indicates significance at the 10 per cent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table VI.3 reports the results from the second approach, in which the dependent variable 
is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in each decade from 1960–99. The 
regressions to fit the estimates are OLS for Models 2.1 and 2.2, one-way fixed effect for   58
Model 2.3, 2SLS for Model 2.4 and 2SLS and one-way fixed effect for Model 2.5. In the 
fixed-effect models, time dummies are added to control the time effects, whereas the 
2SLS models are used for controlling the endogeneity of institutional quality and 
openness.  
 
As in the results in the first approach, the estimates for the TCI have the expected 
negative sign and are highly significant in all regressions. The finding is once again 
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1 that development strategy is a prime 
determinant of the long-run economic growth performance of a country.  
 
The results for other explanatory variables are similar to those in Table VI.2. 
 
Table VI.3 Development strategy and economic growth 












































































(0.12)   59









2  0.08  0.23 0.36 0.08  0.24 
Observations  315  278 278 213  213 
* indicates significance at the 10 per cent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level  
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level  
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita in the decades 1960s, 1970s, 
1980s, 1990s. Models 3.3 and 3.5 include the time dummy. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
VI.4. Development strategy and economic volatility 
Hypothesis 3 is about the effect of a CAD strategy on the volatility of the economic 
growth rate. If a country follows a CAD strategy, there could be a period of investment-
led growth, but it will not be sustainable and is likely to cause economic crisis. Therefore, 
a country that follows a CAD strategy is likely to be more volatile than otherwise. In the 
empirical testing of this hypothesis, the volatility of a country’s per capita GDP growth 
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where git is the growth rate of GDP per capita of i
th country in year t.  
 
In testing Hypothesis 3, the dependent variable is the log of the above measurement of 
volatility,  Vi, and the explanatory variables are the same as those used in testing 
Hypothesis 2. The approaches to fitting the regression equation are also similar to those 
used previously. Table VI.4 reports the results from fitting the regression models. As 
expected, the estimates of the TCI are positive and highly significant in all three 
regressions. The results support Hypothesis 3 and indicate that the deeper a country 
follows a CAD strategy, the more volatile is the country’s economic growth rate. From 
the estimates, it can be inferred that a 10 per cent increase in the TCI could cause   60
volatility to increase about 4–6 per cent. 
 
The estimates for other explanatory variables show that the quality of institutions, the 
degree of openness, whether the country is land-locked and the population size all have 
negative effects on economic volatility. Except for population size—which is a proxy for 
the size of the economy, and its coefficients are significant in the OLS and 2SLS 
models—the estimated coefficients for other variables are significant in the OLS model 
and the 2SLS model. The estimates for the initial per capita income in 1960 and the 
distance from the Equator are insignificant in all three regressions. 
 
Table VI.4 Development strategy and economic volatility 




















RL01   -0.33** 
(0.16) 
 
INST     -0.20 
(0.29) 
LnOPEN1   -0.46*** 
(0.17) 
 
TRADE1     -0.53 
(0.33) 








LnPOP1   -0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.18** 
(0.07)   61
Adjusted-R
2  0.29 0.47 0.37 
Observations 103  93  93 
* indicates significance at the 10 per cent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level  
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level  
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the growth rate’s volatility for GDP per capita from 1962–99. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
VI.5. Development strategy and income distribution 
In testing the effect of development strategy on income distribution, the following 
regression equation is used: 
,, it it GINI C TCI X α βε =+ + +  (4) 
where  , it GINI  is the index of inequality in country i at time t, TCI is a proxy for the 
development strategy and  X  is a vector of other explanatory variables. 
 
GINI coefficients are taken from a revised version of the data set in Deininger and Squire 
(1996). The data set includes the estimation of GINI coefficients for many countries in 
the various literature. Some are estimated according to the data on income; others are 
based on expenditure. The coverage differs between the different countries’ GINI data. 
Deininger and Squire (1996) assessed the quality of GINI coefficient estimations; only 
those ranked as ‘acceptable’ were used in the regression. The original estimates of GINI 
coefficients based on income data are left unchanged, but those based on consumption 
expenditure are adjusted by adding 6.6, which is the average difference between the two 
estimation methods. For details of the calculation of the TCI index and data sources, see 
Lin and Liu (2003). Matching this GINI data with the TCI, I end up with a panel of 261 
samples from 33 countries. Figure VI.3 shows the relationship between the TCI and the 
GINI coefficient. 
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Figure VI.5 Development strategy and income distribution 
 
 
In order to test alternative hypotheses for the determination of inequality, I have included 
the explanatory variables—per capita income,  t i GDPPC , , and its reciprocal, 
t i GDPPC , 1 _ —which test the Kuznets inversed-U hypothesis. If Kuznets’ hypothesis 
holds, the coefficients for these two variables should be significantly negative.
39 
 
Based on the data set of Deininger and Squire (1996), Li et al. (1998) conducted a robust 
empirical test, and the result showed that the GINI coefficient for an individual country 
was relatively constant across different periods. Based on this conclusion, the GINI 
coefficient in the initial year in the data set is introduced into the regression, denoted by 
‘IGINI’. In this way, the historical factors that could affect income distribution and those 
non-observable factors across countries can be excluded. In the data set, the year of 
IGINI differs from country to country. In spite of this difference, the higher the IGINI, 
the higher are the subsequent GINI coefficients—regardless of the initial year. As a result, 
the coefficient of IGINI is expected to be positive.  
                                                        
39 For this specification, please refer to Deininger and Squire (1996). 









Corruption could also affect income distribution. Two explanatory variables are included 
in the regression: the index for corruption,  t i CORR , , and the quality of officials,  t i BQ , . 
The data for these two variables are taken from Sachs and Warner (2000) and they differ 
from country to country but remain constant throughout the period studied. The larger the 
value is, the less is the corruption and the higher is the quality of officials. The 
coefficients of these two variables are expected to be negative. 
 
Foreign trade could also affect income distribution. It affects the relative prices of factors 
of production (Samuelson, 1978) and market opportunities for different sectors in the 
economy. Consequently, trade—through its effect on employment opportunities 
(Krugman and Obstfeld,, 1997)—can affect income distribution. The regression therefore 
includes an index of economic openness, denoted by  t i OPEN , , which is the share of total 
import and export value in nominal GDP, as an explanatory variable. The data are taken 
from Easterly and Yu (2000). Openness could, however, have different impacts on skilled 
and unskilled labour, on tradable and non-tradable sectors and in the short run and in the 
long run. Its sign is therefore uncertain.  
 
Table VI.5 reports the results from five regression models. Model 4.1 includes all 
explanatory variables: TCI, IGINI, GDPPC ,  _1 GDPPC , CORR, BQ and OPEN . As 
CORR, BQ and OPEN  are endogenous, other models exclude these variables to control 
the endogeneity problem. Because IGINI, CORR and BQ  are time invariant, the one-
way effects model is applied in fitting the regression of Models 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4. 
According to Hausman tests, the one-way random-effect model is used in the regressions 
of Models 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4, and the two-way fixed-effect model is used in the regression 
of Models 4.3 and 4.5.    64
 
The estimated coefficients of TCI are positive and significant at the 1 per cent level in all 
five regression models. These results strongly support the hypothesis that the more a 
country pursues a CAD strategy, the more severe will be the income disparity in that 
country. This result holds whether the initial income distribution is equal or unequal. 
 
The estimated coefficients of IGINI are also positive and significant at the 1 per cent 
level in Models 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4. This result is consistent with the finding in Li et al. 
(1998): that is, the initial income distribution will have a carry-over effect in the 
subsequent period’s income distribution. 
 
The estimated coefficients of GDPPC  and  _1 GDPPC  in Models 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4 are all 
insignificant and have an unexpected positive sign—except for GDPPC  in Model 4.1. 
Kuznets’ inversed-U hypothesis of income distribution is therefore rejected. 
 
The results in Model 4.1 show that the coefficient for  t i CORR ,  has an unexpected positive 
sign. One possible reason for this is that the effect of corruption on distribution is not 
reflected accurately in the surveys. The coefficient for bureaucracy quality,  t i BQ , , has an 
expected, but insignificant, negative sign. The coefficient for openness, OPEN, is positive, 
but not significant.  
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CONSTANT 6.46  8.18***  31.5*** 8.09*** 32.6*** 
 (4.72)  (2.40)  (1.75)  (3.16)  (0.97) 
TCI 1.32***  1.35***  1.84*** 1.35*** 1.72*** 
 (0.33)  (0.31)  (0.48)  (0.32)  (0.46) 
IGINI 0.73***  0.71***    0.71***  
 (0.08)  (0.07)    (0.07)   
GDPPC
  -0.89  0.43  0.74   
 (11.3)    (12.6)  (10.8)   
GDPPC_1 0.40    1.91  3.21   
 (1.84)    (2.11)  (16.6)   
CORR 1.03*         
 (0.58)         
BQ -0.84         
 (0.58)         
OPEN 0.12         
 (1.68)         
R
2  0.9040 0.8941 0.5495  0.8936  0.5780 
Hausman statistics  3.32  1.19  23.91  1.99  7.98 
Hausman P-value  0.19  0.28  0.00  0.37  0.00 
Sample  261 observations from 33 countries 
f fixed-effect model  
r random-effect model 
* indicates significance at the 10 per cent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level 
Notes: Null hypothesis of Hausman test: there is a random effect in countries and time. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  
 
From the results above, it is clear that development strategy and initial income 
distribution are the two most important determinants of income distribution in a country. 
As I argue in this Lectures, for a country in which the government follows a CAF strategy, 
income distribution will become more equal even if its initial income distribution is 
unequal. In effect, this is the ‘growth with equity’ phenomenon observed in Taiwan and 
other newly industrialised economies (NIEs) in East Asia (Fei et al., 1979).   66
VI.6. Transition and economic performance 
As argued in this Lectures, development of labour-intensive sectors—in which 
developing countries have comparative advantage—is repressed and many institutions 
are distorted if the government adopts a CAD strategy, resulting in poor resource 
allocation and inefficiency. The growth performance during transition to a market 
economy depends therefore on the country’s ability to create an enabling environment for 
the development of labour-intensive sectors and at the same time find a way to solve the 
viability issue for firms inherited from the previous development strategy. A CAD 
strategy is associated with a high TCI. If, after the reform/transition, a country is able to 
successfully develop labour-intensive sectors, resource allocation and growth 
performance will improve, and the TCI will decline. A successful transition from a CAD 
strategy is therefore expected to result in a negative change in the TCI. The larger the 
negative change is, the higher is the expected growth rate. For the purpose of testing 
Hypothesis 5, therefore, a variable, ΔTCI, is created to measure the difference between 
the log of average TCI in the period 1990–99 and the log of average TCI in the period 
1970–79—as the transition in socialist countries and the reforms in other developing 
countries started in the 1980s.  
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the average annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita in the period 1980–99. In addition to ΔTCI, the explanatory variables 
include the log of average TCI in the 1970s, initial per capita GDP in 1980 and other 
explanatory variables—representing institutional quality, openness and population size—
which are similar to those used in testing Hypothesis 1.  
 
Two approaches are used to test the hypothesis. The first includes observations from all 
countries in the data set, while the second includes only the developing countries defined 
by Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). Both approaches try three regressions—two by OLS 
and one by 2SLS—to control the endogeneity problem of institutional quality and 
openness. Table VI.6 reports the results from the regressions.    67
Table VI.6 Development strategy and the performance of economic reform/transition 


































































RL01   1.31***
(0.37) 
   1.78*** 
(0.47) 
 
INST    0.44 
(0.60) 
  0.96 
(1.18) 
LnOPEN1   0.71* 
(0.36) 
   0.54 
(0.49) 
 
TRADE1     1.50** 
(0.70) 
   2.23* 
(1.26) 

























2  0.13 0.43 0.27  0.03  0.45  0.24 
Observations  76 72 72  50  49  49 
* indicates significance at the 10 per cent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level 
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita from 1980–99. The data samples 
in the regression of Models 6.4–6.6 include only the developing countries defined by Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
As expected, the sign of ΔTCI is negative and the estimates are significantly different   68
from zero in all six regressions. The results support the hypothesis that a larger reduction 
in the TCI from the level in the 1970s to the level in the 1990s has a larger positive effect 
on the average per capita GDP growth rate in the period 1980–99. For a country that 
adopts a CAD strategy, therefore, growth performance will be improved if the 
government manages well the transition from a CAD to a CAF strategy. From the 
estimates, we can infer that a 10 per cent reduction in the TCI level in the 1990s to the 
level of the 1970s could cause a 0.1–0.13 percentage point increase in the average annual 
growth rate of per capita GDP in the period 1980–99. 
 
The other explanatory variables all have the expected signs; however, except for the 
population size—which is positive and highly significant in all six regressions—the other 
variables are either insignificant or significant in some regressions but not in others.  
 
In a nutshell, as predicted by Hypothesis 5, the entry of small and medium-size firms into 
the repressed sectors under a CAD strategy is essential for the economy to achieve 
dynamic growth during the transition process. 
 
VI.7. Concluding remarks 
The above empirical evidence strongly suggests that the development strategy is the 
fundamental determinant of a country’s institutional distortions, economic performance 
and income distribution. If the government in a developing country adopts a CAD 
strategy, it will distort prices and various institutions to protect and subsidise the non-
viable firms in the prioritised industries, which will repress incentives, worsen resource 
allocation, result in poor growth performance and cause the growth rate to be volatile. A 
CAD strategy will lead also to unequal distribution of income in the economy. During 
economic reform and transition, a country’s economic performance depends on its 
government’s ability to create an environment that facilitates the growth of labour-
intensive industries, which have been suppressed in the past due to the government’s 
pursuit of a CAD strategy.  69
 
VII. 
Why are East Asian economies so special?  
Are there any general lessons to be learned from East Asian 
development and transitional experiences? 
East Asian economies seem to be rather special in terms of their development and 
transition performance since World War II. Development ‘miracles’ occurred in the NIEs 
in East Asia and transitional miracles in China and Vietnam. If, as I argue in this Lectures, 
social thinking is the deepest fundamental determinant of government policy and social 
and economic institutions in a country—which in turn determines a country’s economic 
performance—why, under similar social thinking about development in the 1950s and 
1960s and about transition in the 1980s and 1990s, have the East Asian governments 
behaved so different and achieved such miraculous economic success? My analysis is 
incomplete without an answer to this question. 
 
As discussed, China, Vietnam and other East Asian economies adopted a dual-track, 
gradual approach in their transition from centrally planned to market economies, which 
violated the basic tenets of the Washington Consensus and shock therapy. In effect, for its 
transition from a wartime economy after World War II, Japan also adopted a gradual 
approach, whereas Germany adopted a big-bang approach (Teranishi, 1994). In terms of 
development policies in Korea and Taiwan, both governments initially adopted a policy 
mix—including financial repression, over-valued exchange rates, deficit budgets and 
neglect of the agricultural sector—to support the development of labour-intensive 
primary manufacturing industries to substitute the imports of manufactured household 
products—referred to as ‘primary import substitution’. The policy package was typical in 
countries that adopted a CAD strategy. What differentiated Korea and Taiwan from other 
developing countries were two factors, as discussed by Ranis and Mahmood (1992). First, 
after they succeeded in primary import substitution, they relied on their abundant labour 
resources and turned to primary export substitution: they changed their export mix from   70
primarily land-intensive agricultural products to labour-intensive manufactured products 
instead of jumping to secondary import substitution—that is, attempting to develop big, 
heavy industries to substitute imports of capital-intensive machinery and equipment—as 
many other developing countries did. They did not move to the ‘secondary import cum 
substitution’ phase until labour shortages occurred, real wages increased and the 
comparative advantages in labour-intensive industries were lost in the international 
market. Second, repression in the financial sector and the over-valuation of the exchange 
rate were rather mild. The real interest rate was kept positive at all times and the 
difference between the exchange rate on the black market and the official market was 
small. Therefore, the government’s policy mix was close to what I have argued for: 
providing information and overcoming the issues of coordination and externality. The 
industrial upgrading in Taiwan and South Korea has basically followed their comparative 
advantages in each stage of their economic development. Similarly, in post-war Japan, 
the main industries upgraded from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries in 
sequence—textile, simple machine tools, steel, shipbuilding, electronics, automobiles and 
computers—according to changes in comparative advantages (Shinohara, 1982; Ito, 
1994). Singapore and Hong Kong also followed a similar pattern in their economic 
development (World Bank, 1993). 
 
It was not, however, the intentional choice of the government in Japan and other East 
Asia economies to follow a CAF strategy in pursuit of economic development. 
Governments in East Asia also had a strong desire for the development of advanced 
capital-intensive industries—just like governments in other developing countries in the 
1950s and 1960s. Their economies were, however, relatively small in population size and 
their natural resource endowments were extremely poor, which greatly constrained their 
ability to mobilise enough resources to subsidise the non-viable enterprises in the capital-
intensive industries in the early stage of their development (Lin et al., 1996; Ranis and 
Mahmood, 1992). In the early 1950s, Taiwan was influenced by the fashionable post-war 
development thinking and tried to protect and subsidise the development of heavy 
industries by using quantitative restrictions, tariff barriers and subsidised credits via strict 
regulation of banks and other financial intermediaries. The attempt, however, caused   71
severe budget deficits and high inflation. The government in Taiwan had to give up the 
attempt and devalued its currency, liberalised trade and raised the real interest rate to 
encourage savings and contain inflation (Tsiang, 1984). Without preferential protection 
and subsidisation, industrial upgrading in Taiwan followed closely the changes in its 
comparative advantages.  
 
The South Korean government, under the leadership of President Park Chung Hee, 
adopted an ambitious heavy and chemical industry drive in 1973. It was adopted, 
however, only after obtaining rapid economic growth by developing and exporting 
labour-intensive textiles, plywood, wigs and other light-industrial products for more than 
a decade in the 1960s. Therefore, the drive reflected partially the necessity arising from 
the demand for upgrading the industries. It was, however, too ambitious—causing the 
inflation rate, measured in the consumer price index, to jump from 3.1 per cent in 1972 to 
24.3 per cent in 1973, 25.3 per cent in 1974 and maintained in two digits throughout the 
rest of the 1970s. By late 1978 and early 1979, President Park was increasingly 
concerned with stabilisation and social welfare and, after his assassination in October 
1979, the South Korean government—like the Taiwanese government in the1950s—
subdued its support to heavy and chemical industries (Stern et al., 1995).
40  
                                                        
40 Compared with most other developing countries, South Korea’s industrial upgrading has followed quite 
closely its comparative advantage at each stage of its development, which can be inferred from the facts 
that Korean products are competitive in international markets once the government helps the enterprises 
with the initial supports and protection to build up the production capacities. So the enterprises in those 
industries are viable. Compared with Taiwan, however, South Korea’s development strategy after the 1970s 
was more ambitious and the South Korean government was required to give protection for longer and more 
subsidies to its enterprises than Taiwan did. As the model by Krugman (1987) suggests, the heavy and 
chemical drive in the 1970s changed the human capital endowment in South Korea through the effect of 
learning by doing, enabling South Korean enterprises to jump from OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturer)  directly to OBM (Original Brand Manufacturer), while Taiwanese enterprises in general 
followed step-by-step from OEM to ODM (Original Design Manufacturer) and finally to OBM (Lee, 2007). 
South Korea today is quite competitive in capital-intensive industries, such as steel, shipbuilding, 
automobiles and electronics, and these industries in general are heavier than in Taiwan. Taiwan’s economic 
performance, however—measured in terms of the economic growth rate, per capita income levels and 
macro stability—has been better than South Korea’s. Taiwan weathered the East Asian financial crisis in   72
 
A CAD strategy is very inefficient. How long such a strategy can be maintained depends 
on the level of resources the government can mobilise to subsidise the non-viable 
enterprises and to support the investment in the prioritised industries. Resource 
mobilisation is constrained by the natural resource endowment and population size. 
Contrasting with the case of ‘resource curse’ in many parts of the developing world 
(Diamond, 1997; Pomeranz, 2000; Sachs and Warner, 1997, 2001), the East Asian 
economies were lucky in the sense that their governments needed to be pragmatic in their 
policies and unintentionally follow a CAF strategy—even though their governments had 
strong motivations for nation building.
41 China’s Confucian culture—which has a strong 
impact in East Asia—is pragmatic in nature. The core of Confucianism is ‘zhongyong’, 
the golden mean, which advises people to maintain balance, avoid extremes and achieve 
harmony with the outside, changing world. The political philosophy and policy principles 
promoted by the communist leadership of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, 
Hu Jingtao are, respectively, ‘shishiqiushi’ (finding truth from the facts), ‘jiefangsixiang’ 
(freeing one’s mind from dogmatism), ‘yushijujin’ (adapting to the changing environment) 
and ‘hexie’ (harmony)—all reflecting the traditional Chinese culture of zhongyong. 
 
When Deng Xiaoping started his reforms in 1979—in addition to his philosophy of 
freeing one’s mind from the dogmatism of the left and the right—the adoption of a 
gradual, piecemeal approach could have reflected the political constraints he faced. Deng 
was one of the first generation of political leaders who introduced socialism and the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the late 1990s without much harm, while the South Korean economy encountered a severe melt-down and 
was forced to accept a conditional IMF rescue. In the past few years, the South Korean economy has 
outperformed the Taiwanese economy, however, Taiwan’s relatively poor performance is likely the result of 
its government’s policies to obstruct the further integration of the Taiwanese economy with the economy of 
mainland China. In contrast, the South Korean government has been supportive of integration between its 
economy and the Chinese economy.  
41 An example is China’s great leap forward in 1958–60, which aimed to use China’s vast population to 
rapidly transform the country from a primarily agrarian economy dominated by peasant farmers to a 
modern, industrialised society. The result was a great famine in 1959–61, which caused 30 million extra 
deaths (Lin, 1990; Lin and Yang, 2000).    73
planned economy to China. In an Oriental society, the power of a leader is based mainly 
on the personal prestige that leader receives from the people, rather than on the office he 
or she holds,
42 and it is hard for a leader to renounce policies that they pursued in the past. 
Therefore, when Deng replaced Mao as China’s supreme leader after the death of Mao in 
1976, it was natural for Deng to carry out piecemeal, tinkering, Pareto-improving 
changes to the old system. Similarly, the reforms in Vietnam and other East Asian 
economies were initiated by the first-generation revolutionaries who had brought 
socialism and planned economies to their countries. 
 
Ideas and social thoughts can be shaped by people’s experiences. My first visit to India 
was in 1988 to attend the inauguration conference of the Indira Ghandi Institute of 
Development Research in Mumbai. I visited four other cities—Kolkata, Madurai, 
Ahmadabad and New Delhi—and met Indian economists. I found many were suspicious 
of the success of China’s reforms and they repeatedly questioned the reliability of 
China’s statistical data. I had the impression that they were quite pessimistic about the 
possibility of carrying out fundamental change and breaking the Indian growth rate of 
about 3 per cent per annum. After 1988, I visited India again every three or four years 
and, on each trip, I found Indian economists’ perceptions of China’s reforms were 
becoming increasingly favourable and India’s own reforms gained momentum. The 
Indian economy has been growing at a rate of about 6–8 per cent in the past two decades. 
The unbreakable ‘Hindu equilibrium’—a term used to describe the age-old combination 
of economic stagnation and cultural stability by Deepak Lal (2005)—has started to 
shatter. I do not know how large the impact of China’s success will be on India’s reform. 
I do, however, see clearly that most economists’ ideas about the role of government and 
the market have changed in the past two decades and a new pro-market social thinking 
has emerged. 
Before I answer the question of whether East Asia’s success—especially its transitional 
experience—has a general implication for other developing and transitional economies, I 
                                                        
42 In his final years, Deng’s only formal position was as honorary chairman of China’s bridge association. 
He was, however, the de facto supreme leader until his death.   74
need to provide an analysis of the failure of gradual reforms in Poland, Hungary and the 
former Soviet Union in the 1980s before their adoption of shock therapy. They also tried 
to reform their planning systems by giving state-owned enterprises more autonomy. Their 
partial reforms did not, however, have the positive results of the reforms in China and 
Vietnam. A number of explanations are in order. First, unlike in China and Vietnam—
where state-owned enterprises, after fulfilling their plan obligations, were allowed to sell 
their extra outputs at market prices—the enterprises in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union were not allowed to set their prices (Sachs, 1993, p. 28). This price rigidity 
meant that excess demand and chronic shortages remained and the state producers did not 
have the incentives to allocate their products to more efficient users, who would then 
have been able to pay higher prices for their products. Second, market entry by non-state 
enterprises was subject to severe restrictions (Kornai, 1986). Production remained 
monopolised and international trade was centrally regulated (Sachs and Lipton, 1990). 
The existing state-owned enterprises therefore never faced real competition pressure from 
domestic or international sources and lacked the incentives to improve productivity. 
Third, in the traditional Soviet-type system, to prevent managerial discretion under the 
distorted macro-policy environment, state-owned enterprises were not allowed to set their 
workers’ wage level. In the Chinese case, after the profit-sharing arrangement was 
introduced to the state-owned enterprises, wages were still controlled by the State. A 
worker’s wage would increase only if the enterprise’s profits exceeded a preset level. In 
Poland, Hungary and the former USSR, however, partial reforms gave the enterprises the 
autonomy to set their workers’ wages. The weakening of state control on wages gave 
managers and workers an opportunity to increase their incomes at the expense of the 
State by absorbing whatever income flow and whatever assets they could obtain from 
state-owned enterprises. The State’s revenues were thus greatly curtailed.
43 Fourth, wage 
inflation caused the shortage to become even more acute; governments in Poland and in 
the former USSR then tried to play a populist game. They increased the imports of 
                                                        
43 China and Vietnam also encountered this problem to some extent. In spite of the increase in productivity, 
the profitability of the state-owned enterprises declined. As a result, the government’s fiscal revenue from 
the state-owned enterprises was reduced substantially (McKinnon, 1995).   75
consumer goods and forced a heavy burden of foreign debt on their countries (Aslund, 
1991). Because of this, instead of bringing continuous growth and a gradual transition to 
a market economy—as in China and Vietnam—the partial reforms led Poland and the 
former USSR to the brink of bankruptcy and hyperinflation.  
 
The transition from a CAD-type economy to a market economy in socialist and 
developing countries proved difficult. A transitional economy’s institutions must be weak 
and there will be severe distortions in prices and production structures. Shock therapy—
which characterises a macro-first approach to building up the requisite market 
institutions—cannot deliver a rapid jump to a prosperous market economy. The 
experiences in China and other East Asian economies show that deep and extensive 
reforms are not required for dynamic growth at the onset of the transition (Rodrick, 2003). 
As such, the crucial issue in transition is to have a strategy of sequencing reforms that 
identifies the most pressing bottle-necks and concentrates resources on the relaxation of 
binding constraints, removing the suppression of incentives and inspiring people to 
improve performance to achieve a better life by their own efforts (McKinnon, 1993; 
Rawski, 1995). The IMF/World Bank’s macro-first reform approach might be appropriate 
for an economy in which market institutions are more or less intact and the structural 
imbalance is small. To use the famous analogy in a somewhat different version, ‘When 
the chasm is narrow, it’s all right to jump over it.’ The stabilisation program can achieve 
its goal immediately and the economy can soon operate in a normal market environment. 
In a country that has pursued a CAD strategy for a long time with severe distortions and a 
large number of non-viable enterprises, the chasm will be too wide and too deep. A jump 
without careful preparation will result in a disastrous fall. In such a situation, it is 
desirable to fill and narrow the chasm before making the jump. The East Asian 
experience suggests that with a small change that provides the right incentives for people 
it is possible to unleash dynamic growth on a weak institutional base, leading to an 
eventual transition to a fully fledged, well-functioning market economy. For a developing 
country that follows a CAD strategy, there must be distortions in the incentive system, 
which suppress individual efforts in production, and there must be industries that are   76
consistent with the economy’s comparative advantages but which are repressed. The 
useful lessons from the gradual, dual-track, micro-first approach to transition in East Asia 
can be summarised as follows. 
 
•  The government can take measures to improve individual incentives by 
granting partial managerial autonomy and profit-sharing to farms and state-
owned enterprises in order to improve incentives and allow the economy to 
move closer to the production frontier, which will induce a new stream of 
output growth.  
•  The government can introduce a dual-track price and allocation system to 
replace the old single-track plan. It can remove market entry restrictions to 
allow resources to be allocated increasingly by the non-state sector to the 
previously suppressed, more productive industries, while maintaining the 
quota obligations of state-owned enterprises and farms in order to secure 
adequate resources to subsidise the existing non-viable enterprises.
44 
•  When the products in a sector are allocated largely by the market track, it is 
time for the government to introduce full market liberalisation in the sector. 
•  The government should introduce continually the necessary regulations and 
laws to strengthen market institutions during the above process. 
 
The above principles or experiences of other countries should not be applied in a 
dogmatic way. One example is China’s reform in 1979 of its household responsibility 
system, which leased collectively owned land to farm households for 15 years. Like 
many reforms in China, it was initiated by farmers, sanctioned by the government and 
introduced nation-wide only after its performance was demonstrated. This reform resulted 
in a dramatic increase in agricultural productivity and output growth (Lin, 1992). The 
government of the former Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev adopted similar 
                                                        
44 Prices here include foreign exchange rates, wage rates, interest rates and the prices of all products and 
services.   77
reforms of its state farms with 50-year leases. Theoretically, the Russian reforms seemed 
to be better than the Chinese reforms because of their longer and more secure tenure 
arrangements; however, the Soviet government had a hard time finding farmers willing to 
accept this arrangement. In hindsight, the failure of the Soviet Union’s reforms might 
have been because its state farms were highly mechanised, depended heavily on 
purchased inputs—such as chemical fertilisers and fuel—in the production process and 
were far away from markets. As such, a small individual household farm was not viable. 
The opposite was true in China. In a gradual, piecemeal reform, therefore, the 
government should not have a predetermined, grand blueprint. Instead, it should follow a 
diagnostic approach, finding out the most crucial binding constraints on incentives and 
resource allocation and introducing reform measures that are effective but which can be 
regarded as ‘half-way measures’ by market fundamentalists—as argued recently by 
Hausmann et al. (2006). In the process, the government should encourage and pay 
attention to local and private initiatives in institutional innovations—as demonstrated 
convincingly by the experiences in China and the stories of Easterly (2006). In this regard, 
political wisdom derived from Chinese culture—shishiqiushi (finding truth from the 
facts), jiefangsixiang (freeing one’s mind from dogmatism) and yushijujin (adapting to 
the changing environment)—could be relevant to reform-minded governments in other 
developing and transitional countries.  
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VIII.  
Toward a Right Development and Transition Strategy 
Freedom of the will…means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge 
of the subject. 
— Friedrich Engels (1877) 
 
So far, what I have argued in the Lectures are as follows:. 
 
•  Continuous technological upgrading is the most important driving force for a 
country’s long-term dynamic growth in modern times. By using the 
advantage of backwardness, a developing country has the opportunity to 
catch up to and converge with developed countries’ per capita income levels. 
•  Ideas are the most vital determinants of whether a developing country will be 
able to achieve long-term dynamic growth. With the guidance of right ideas, 
a developing country will be able to exploit the advantage of backwardness, 
achieve dynamic growth and converge with developed countries. Historical 
evidence shows, however, that the ideas reflected in the dominant social 
thinking about how a developing country should develop its economy are not 
correct because the idea wrongly took the result of development, that is 
possessing advanced industries in a country, as the cause of development in a 
country.  
•  The government is the most important institution in a developing country. 
The policies pursued by the government will shape the quality of other 
institutions and the incentive structure in the economy. Political leaders run 
the government, therefore, it is necessary to understand their motivation and 
behaviour in order to understand the country’s policies. The political leader’s 
motivation is not necessary selfish—as Alfred Marshall indicated—
especially for those leaders who fight for their nation’s independence and 
prosperity. A political leader’s behaviour and policy choices are, however,   79
shaped by current social thinking as well as domestic and economic 
constraints. With good intentions therefore political leaders can adopt 
incorrect policies and cause government failure in the country’s development. 
•  The endowments are the most important binding constraint on a country’s 
choice of technology and industry. A country’s endowments can be 
accumulated and altered through time. At any given time, they determine the 
total budget of the country and its endowment structure—that is, the relative 
abundance of human and physical capital, labour and natural resources—and 
the relative prices of capital, labour and natural resources, which in turn 
determine endogenously the most competitive technologies and industries in 
the country at that time.  
•  Comparative advantage is the most important guiding principle not only for 
trade, but for economic development in a developing country. A developing 
country that relies on its comparative advantages to guide its choice of 
industry and technology will be most competitive in domestic and 
international markets, producing the largest possible economic surplus, 
accumulating the largest possible capital and upgrading its endowment 
structure as well as its technology and industry in the fastest possible way. 
As such, the country will have the fastest speed of convergence with 
developed countries. On the other hand, if a developing country attempts to 
violate its comparative advantage in its choice of industry and technology, 
the economy will not be competitive in domestic and international markets. 
Not only will the country not be able to converge with developed countries, 
it could encounter stagnation and various crises. 
•  Viability is the most important concept for understanding the cause of 
various institutional distortions in developing countries. An enterprise will be 
viable in a competitive market only if its technology and industrial choices 
are consistent with its comparative advantages, determined by the economy’s 
endowment structure. Due to the influence of inappropriate ideas and social 
thinking, however, most developing-country governments attempt to develop 
overly capital-intensive industries, making the enterprises in the priority   80
industries non-viable. Governments are therefore obliged to provide the non-
viable enterprises with protection and subsidisation through various 
distortions. The institutional distortions are therefore endogenous to the 
viability constraints of the enterprises. 
•  Pragmatism is the most important policy guidance for economic transition. 
In developing countries’ economic reform and socialist countries’ transition 
to a market economy, policy recommendations based on the Washington 
Consensus are not adequate because they are based on assumptions that all 
enterprises in an economy are viable and the existing distortions are 
exogenous. A gradual, piecemeal approach to reform and transition—
designed diagnostically and pragmatically according to reality—could enable 
the country to achieve stability and dynamic growth simultaneously and 
allow the country to complete its transition to a market economy.  
 
Under their governments’ leadership, the East Asian economies have been able to exploit 
the opportunities provided by the advantage of backwardness and they have achieved 
convergence with developed countries. China and Vietnam have been successful in 
achieving dynamic growth in their transition to market economies. These successes 
reflect the importance of their governments’ policy choices because of their inability to 
follow the dominant social thinking due to their resource constraints. With their 
development policies closely following their comparative advantages and their transition 
policies designed pragmatically and diagnostically—and with the high social capacity 
inherited from their long-established civilisations—the East Asian economies have 
created one miracle after another in terms of economic development and transition since 
the end of World War II. The success of the East Asian economies has involved an 
element of luck, however, resource constraints and a long-established civilisation are not 
necessary or sufficient conditions for economic success—as demonstrated by the success 
of Botswana and Mauritius in Africa and Chile in South America. I therefore share Arthur 
Lewis’s (1955, p. 418) optimism: ‘[A]ll nations have opportunities which they may grasp 
if only they can summon up the courage and the will.’ From so many stories of success 
and failure in economic development and transition in modern times, again I agree with   81
Lewis’s judgement, ‘[I]t is possible for a nation to take a new turn if it is fortunate to 
have the right leadership at the right time.’ A political leader certainly worries about 
his/her security of tenure in office and his/her own place in the nation’s history; the best 
way to ensure security of tenure and historical standing—regardless of the political 
system—is to bring prosperity to the nation. All political leaders in developing countries 
can therefore be safely said to have the motivation to do good for their country. The 
success or failure of economic development and transition in a developing country need 
not be a matter of destiny, if the political leader knows what the right policies for the 
nation are.  
 
I hope that the Lectures will make a small contribution to the knowledge that helps 
developing and transitional countries jump from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom 
of freedom in their pursuit of economic development and transition to a developed, 
wealthy market economy.  
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Apendix I 




As discussed in the Lectures, after World War II, governments in the developing 
countries)—socialist and non-socialist—instituted a complicated set of regulations and 
distortions that suppressed the functions of markets, such as financial depression, trade 
restriction, rationing of capital and foreign exchange, licensing of investments, 
administrative monopoly and state ownership. It has been recognised now that, no matter 
what the motivation might be, these policies often lead to poor economic performance, 
low living standards and even frequent crises in the developing countries. There are many 
competing hypotheses about the cause and effect of those regulations and distortions. 
However, none reveals convincingly the relationships between various policies in the 
complicated set of regulations and distortions.  
 
The classical theory for governments’ regulations (Pigou, 1938) has been called the 
helping-hand view. Seeing the adverse effects of governments’ regulations and distortions 
in the developing countries, economists have proposed an alternative ‘grabbing-hand’ 
view (Acemoglu, 2007b; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). These authors proposed that government interventions 
were pursued for the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats—for example, favouring 
friendly firms and other political constituencies so as to obtain benefits such as campaign 
contributions and votes,
45  or benefiting selected groups within a country who had 
unusually strong political influence.  
 
While government regulations and distortions in developing countries could theoretically 
arise from the rent extraction of the government or political élites, understanding the 
                                                        
∗ The appendix is prepared with the help of Pengfei Zhang. Binkai Chen, Zhaoyang Xu, all members of 
CCER Development Worshop and seminar participants at NYU provided helpful comments and 
suggestions. Much of Zhang’s work was completed at CID Harvard University and NBER. Zhang would 
like to thank Martin Feldstein, Ricardo Hausman and Dani Rodrik as well as these two organizations for 
their kind hospitality. 
45  A recent paper presented by Djankov et al. (2002) provided an empirical test of the grabbing-hand 
theories and suggested that the barrier for business entry might arise from the corruption of bureaucrats.   83
complexity of such policies remains an unsolved question in the literature. In developing 
countries, the institutional arrangements shaped by government intervention are quite 
complicated. What are the governments’ incentives to institute such a complicated system, 
which increases the costs of expropriations and political control and diminishes the gains 
of grab? Corruption induced by special-interest groups might not be a good explanation 
for this question either, because the groups that benefit from the regulations are often 
taxed or suppressed along with the protections and/or subsidies. In fact, many 
interventions do not have obvious beneficiary groups (Lin et al., 2007). 
 
Beyond the arguments from the helping and grabbing-hand categories, some recent 
theoretical works suggest that government regulations and distortions in developing 
countries might be designed to alleviate the problems of tax collection. Gordon and Li 
(2005a, 2005b) argue that tax enforcement depends heavily on the availability of 
information from outside a firm about the scale of its economic activities. Such 
information comes largely from the firm’s recorded transactions through the financial 
sector. Most production activities in a developing country are in the informal economy 
and rely on cash transactions—and they are virtually impossible to monitor and tax. 
Gordon and Li argue that tariff protection is used to compensate firms in the formal 
sectors that face high effective tax rates, control of lending is used to redirect credit to 
heavily taxed sectors, inflation is used as a tax on firms that rely on cash to avoid tax, and 
red tape and fees are used to impose non-tax costs on businesses that in practice pay little 
or no taxes. Esfahani (2000) proposes that, as the administrative weakness is exaggerated, 
the government is likely to control production capacity directly through state ownership. 
While this argument captures the intrinsic difficulty of taxation in developing countries, it 
offers few insights into the government’s purpose for collecting taxes and why the 
government would not create a policy environment that allows the informal sectors to 
grow into formal sectors so as to enlarge the tax base. 
 
In the Lectures, I propose an alternative explanation for the root cause and internal logic 
of the complicated interventionist policies in developing countries. Motivated by the 
dream of modernization, nation building, and gaining political as well as economic   84
independence, most developing countries’ governments—socialist and non-socialist 
alike—adopted various measures that attempted to accelerate development of their then-
advanced capital-intensive industries after World War II. An economy’s optimal industrial 
structure is, however, determined endogenously by its endowment structure (Lin and 
Zhang, 2007). The firms in the government’s priority industries are not viable in an open, 
competitive market because these industries do not match the comparative advantage of 
the particular economy. As such, it is imperative for the government to introduce a series 
of regulations and intervention in international trade, the financial sector, the labour 
market and so on in order to mobilise resources for setting up and supporting the 
continuous operation of non-viable firms. this kind of development mode—in which the 
economic institution is distorted as a coherent whole with its own inherent logic, 
necessary components and natural interaction of those components (Ericson, 1991; 
Kornai, 1992)—could be found in China and other Soviet-type economies before their 
transition to market economies in the 1980s or 1990s, and to a lesser extent in many other 
developing countries after World War II. This type of economy might be good at 
mobilising scarce resources and concentrating on a few clear, well-defined priority 
sectors (Ericson, 1991), but it will prove detrimental economy-wide (Sah and Stiglitz, 
1987b) and will be highly costly for long-run growth (Acemoglu et al., 2006).  
 
This appendix attempts to a model to reveal the intrinsic logic of various institutional 
components in a three-sector model with consideration of a government’s pursuing a 
CAD strategy. The inefficient regulations and distortions in the model resemble those 
inefficient institutions in Acemoglu (2007b). Whereas Acemoglu’s model emphasises the 
élite’s use of political power to institute policies to increase their income through the 
direct or indirect transfer of resources from the rest of the society to themselves, I 
emphasise the governments’ aim of building up advanced sectors at the early stage of 
their development with the benevolent purpose of nation building. 
 
The remainder of the appendix is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the basic 
economic model and characterises equilibrium without governmental distortion—that is, 
under  laissez-faire. Section 3 extends the basic model to analyse the formation of   85
distorted prices for products and essential factors of production, highly centralised, 
planned resource-allocation systems and a micro-management mechanism in which firms 
have no autonomy. Section 4 provides the concluding remarks. 
 
2. The basic model 
2.1 Model set-up 
The analysis in the appendix is based on a simple three-sector model of a dual economy. I 
consider a small developing country that trades three final goods—that is, rural goods, 
labour-intensive industrial goods and capital-intensive industrial goods—at exogenously 
given world prices. The exogenously given world prices (shadow prices) for rural goods, 
labour-intensive goods and capital-intensive goods are  a p ,  l p  and  c p  respectively.  I 
assume that rural goods and labour-intensive goods can be used only for consumption, 
while capital-intensive goods can be used only for investment.
46 Consumption goods are 
assumed to be normal. 
 
In the rural sector, natural resources (rural land) and rural labour are combined to produce 
rural output. The rural production function, which exhibits constant returns to scale, is 
1 (, ) a YF T H = . 
 
The variables  a Y , T  and 
1 H   refer to rural output produced, total natural resources—
which are owned within the rural sector—and total rural labour employed in the sector, a. 
As in Sah and Stiglitz (1984), the role of incentives in the rural sector is also emphasised 
in our model.
47  I assume the rural sector’s population to be 
1 N —thus, 
111 / H Nh ≡  
denotes the hours worked by each rural worker and 
1 / TN t ≡  denotes natural resources 
per rural worker. I denote a rural worker’s consumption of rural and labour-intensive 
goods to be 
11 (,) al cc . The surplus of the rural good per rural worker is given by 
11 (, ) a SF t h c ≡− . The utility function and budget constraint of a rural worker are 
                                                        
46 I ignore the possibility of labour-intensive industrial goods being used for consumption and investment to 
avoid undue complexity, but the model in this appendix could easily be expanded to include this possibility. 
47 Lin (1990) emphasises the role of incentives in production team in rural sector owing to the difficulty of 
supervising rural work.   86
represented by 
11 1 1 (,,) al UU c c h =  and 
1
al l p Sp c ≥  respectively. 
 
The urban population is
2 N , and an urban worker supplies 
2 h  hours of work inelastically. 
I normalise 
2 1 h =   for simplicity; therefore, the total urban labour supply in this   
developing country is equal to the urban population—that is, 
22 H N ≡ . I denote an urban 
worker’s consumption of rural and labour-intensive goods as
22 (,) al cc. The utility function 
and budget constraint of an urban worker are given by 
22 2 (,) al UU c c =  and 
22
aa ll p cp cw +≤  respectively, where w is the wage of an urban worker per hour. 
 
Capital and urban labour are combined to produce industrial output in the labour-
intensive and capital-intensive sectors. The total capital stock in the developing country 
isK , and 
2 / kK N ≡  is capital stock per urban worker. 
 
The production function for the labour-intensive sector, l, is as follows: 
1
ll l l YA K H
β β − =  (1). 
 
Production of capital-intensive products requires (1 ) δ − Γ units of capital-intensive goods 
as fixed input firstly
48—that is, it requires paying a sunk entry cost, (1 ) δ − Γ, where δ  is 
a constant. this  satisfies (0,1) δ ∈ , and then allows variable input—that is, capital and 
urban labour—to produce final output according to the following production function: 
1
cc c c YA K H
α α − =  (2) 
Here, the subscript l   denotes the labour-intensive sector and c   denotes the capital-
                                                        
48 We introduce fixed input or sunk entry cost (1 ) δ − Γ  in the process of producing capital-intensive goods 
to reflect the basic characteristics of heavy industry in developing countries at their early stage of 
development, as summarised in Lin et al. (2003). One source of the fixed cost (1 ) δ − Γ  is the time and 
resources spent on learning the technology from the developed country. The larger the technology gap 
between the developing countries and the developed country, the larger is the cost. The other source of the 
fixed cost for a capital-intensive firm in the developing country is the need to invest in production of most 
non-key components as well as key components by the firm itself, whereas the firm in a developed country 
could outsource most non-key components to other firms in the economy. The sunk entry cost,(1 ) δ −Γ , 
could reflect the additional investment in production capacity for non-key components.    87
intensive sector. Because sector c is more capital intensive than sectorl, we have α β > . 
The variables j A ,  j Y ,  j K  and  j H   refer to total factor productivity, output produced, 
capital and urban labour employed in sector  , j lc = . The Cobb-Douglas form of 
production functions is adopted for tractability. 
For analytical convenience, as in Hansen and Prescott (2002), I also assume that firms 
operating in each sector are competitive—that is, the firms in sector  , j lc =  are price 
takers—and I also assume that there is at most one firm (if this  firm is viable) in each 
sector. As in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), I assume that  j σ  of the firm’s profits, j π , is 
owned by the manager,  j m , and fraction 1 j σ −   is owned by the treasury, which is 
assumed to be passive in this appendix, where  , j lc = .
49 For the sake of simplicity, I do 
not distinguish between the manager and the shareholders of the firm because I assume 
that the manager and the shareholders share common interests. I also assume that the 
labour-intensive firm’s manager, l m , and the capital-intensive firm’s manager,  c m , are 
risk neutral—therefore, the utility function of the manager,  l m , can be expressed by 
l ml l U σ π = . The utility function of the manager, c m , is expressed by 
c mc c U σ π = . 
 
2.2 Competitive equilibrium without government intervention 
Throughout this appendix, I consider a developing country whose capital stock per urban 
worker equals k δ
− , and k














⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −
= ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.
50 
Given rural population 
1 N , urban population 
2 N , natural resources per rural worker t, 
working hours of urban labour 
2 1 h ≡ , total capital stock K  in this  developing country, 
and the exogenously given world prices (shadow prices) for rural goods  a p , labour-
intensive goods  l p  and capital-intensive goods  c p , a competitive equilibrium without 
government intervention consists of a combination of the firm’s allocations 
                                                        
49 In the model,  j σ  describes the ownership of cash flows of the firm, which is close to zero in a publicly 
owned firm and close to 1 in a private firm. 
50 In our model, the extent of the scarcity in capital endowment in the developing country is an increasing 
function of  (0,1) δ ∈ .   88
{,, , } ll c c K LKH , rural worker’s allocations 
111 {,,} al cch , urban worker’s allocations 
22 {,} al cc, a tuple of the net exports of rural goods, labour-intensive goods and capital-
intensive goods {,,} alc E EE , a (nominal) wage rate w for urban labour, and a (nominal) 
rental rate r  for capital, such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
1. Given output prices and factor prices{,,, , } alc p ppw r, the  j  firm’s allocation 
{,} j j K L  solves the following profit-maximisation problem: 
, max  
jj
j KL π  (3) 
Where 
1
ll l l l l l p AK H rK wH
ββ π
− =− −  
and
1 [( 1 ) ] cc c c c c c p AK H r K w H
αα πδ
− =− − Γ − − . 
2. Given the output prices and wage rate for the urban worker{,, } al p pw, the 
rural worker’s allocations maximise 
11 1 1 (,,) al UU c c h =  subject to
1
al l p Sp c ≥ , and 
the urban worker’s allocations maximise 
22 2 (,) al UU c c =  subject 
to
222
aa ll p cp cw h +≤. 
3. Markets clear: 
lc K KK +=  
2
lc H HH += 
12 2
aa NS Nc E =+  
11 22
lll l qN cN cE =++  
4. Trade balance: 
0 aa ll cc pE pE pE ++ =  
5. Investment equation: 
(1 ) ,   if     (1 ) 0








−+− −Γ − −Γ > ⎧
= ⎨−− − Γ ≤ ⎩
 
 
Given output prices (,) lc p p   and factor prices(,) wr , the cost function of the labour-  89















= ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, and the variable cost function of the 














⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
,
51 where  l q  and  c q  are the outputs 
produced by the labour-intensive firm and the capital-intensive firm respectively. 
Summarising the analysis above, I have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: For a developing country whose capital stock per urban worker 
equalskk δ
− = , the capital-intensive firm would have incurred a loss if it had been set up 
and operated
52—therefore, only the labour-intensive firm is operated in this developing 
country. 
 
Proof: Given output prices{,} lc p p , the diversification cone of production functions 
1
ll l l YA K H
β β − =  and 
1
cc c c YA K H
α α − =  is  [,] kk
−










ββ β α αα
ββ
− − − ⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −
= ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. 
Therefore, the capital-intensive production process would not be operated in a developing 
country whose capital stock per urban worker equalled kk δ
− = , even without the fixed 
costs (1 ) c p δ −Γ; only the labour-intensive firm is operated in this  developing country. — 
QED. 
 
From Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium (real) wage and (real) rental rate of 
capital when labour-intensive good is used as numeraire
















β β =−  (5) 
                                                        
51 The form of total cost function of the capital-intensive firm in this appendix resembles that in Bernard et 
al. (2007). 
52 We could say a firm is non-viable when it incurs a net loss in the current appendix. 
53 The labour-intensive good is set as numeraire in the model.   90
 
The utility of manager  l m  is 0
l m U = , and the utility of manager  c m  is  0
c m U = . In fact, 
we can denote the reservation utility of manager  l m  and manager  c m  to be  0
l m U
−




=  respectively. 
 
The indirect utility function of the rural worker is obtained from 
()
111
11 1 1 1 1 1
,,
, m a x(,,) [( ,) ]
al
a












1 λ   is the rural worker’s positive marginal utility of (real) income. From the 












, which means that the rural worker’s utility is an 
increasing function of rural output price  a p  and a decreasing function of labour-intensive 
output price  l p . I assume that there is a lower bound value  al p
−
 for the relative price of 
rural products to labour-intensive products  al p p  such that









the subsistence level for the rural worker. That is, I assume an agricultural crisis would 
occur if the relative price of a rural product to a labour-intensive product were less than 
the threshold value al p
−




The indirect utility function of the urban worker is obtained from 
()
22
22 2 2 2 2
,
,m a x ( , ) [ ]
al
a




Vpp w p U c c cc
pp
λ =+ − −  
where 
2 λ   is the urban worker’s positive marginal utility of real income. From the 























, which means 
                                                        
54 Please see Lin (1990) as well as Lin and Yang (2000) for details of China’s agricultural crisis and the 
Chinese famine in 1959–61. In fact, the problem of apparent food shortages emerged acutely and visibly in 
India in the late 1950s, and were experienced elsewhere as well (Krueger, 1995).   91
that the urban worker’s utility is an increasing function of the real wage rate  l wpand a 
decreasing function of the relative price of a rural product to a labour-intensive product 
al p p . I also assume that, for a given relative price of rural product to labour-intensive 
product  al p
−
, there exists a threshold value,  l w
−
, for the real wage rate  l wp, such that 








 is the subsistence level for the urban worker. The minimum 
real wage in the developing country should, therefore, be not less than l w
−
, or else the 
urban worker could not afford to buy adequate rural products or/and labour-intensive 
goods. 
 
The additive Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is given by 
() ( )
11 1 22 2 ,, al al l NW V p p t NW V p p w p ψ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (6) 
where (.)
i W  is a concave and increasing function of  (.)
i V ,  1, 2 i = . 
 
The amount of investment in this  developing country without government intervention is 
{}
11 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
[( , ) ]( ) aa a l l l l
c
I pN F t h N c N c pA H k N c N c
p
β =− − + − − . 
 
From the analysis above, it is obvious that given that resources are allocated by the 
market mechanism, producers will decide what to produce according to market prices of 
outputs and factors, and they will not produce capital-intensive goods in a developing 
country whose capital stock per urban worker equalskk δ
− ≡ . Consequently, if resources 
were allocated by the market mechanism, capital would not flow to the capital-intensive 
heavy-industry sector. Rather, industrialisation featuring light industry would occur, 
which would be contrary to the goal of implementing a catch-up type of CAD heavy 
industry-oriented development strategy in the developing countries. Therefore, without a 
cluster of intervention policies being enforced, the government in the developing country 
could not successfully enforce the catch-up type of CAD strategy. 
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3. The trinity of economic institutions under a CAD strategy 
Now I analyse the intrinsic logic of government intervention policies in the developing 
countries and how these are generated by the catch-up type of CAD strategy. For this  
reason, I define the utility function of the government (politicians) in developing 
countries. Suppose that the government in a developing country benefits from adopting a 
catch-up type of CAD strategy—that is, the government g  in the developing country 
could gain utility  () c B q   from the output of capital-intensive product  c q  produced  in 
his/her country, where  ( ) c Bq   is twice continuously differentiable, with  ( ) 0 c Bq ′ >  and 








′ = ∞. I assume that the utility function of 
the government, g , in the developing country is given by  () g c UI B q ψ ρ = ++ , where I  
is investment in the developing country, ρ   denotes the marginal social value of the 
investment and ψ  is given by (6).
55 
 
3.1 Distorting relative prices 
3.1.1 Output price distortion. In order to set up heavy-industry projects, the government 
in the developing country could rely on collecting taxes from the rural and labour-
intensive sectors to subsidise the capital-intensive sector.
56 I denote the tax rates in the 
rural sector and the labour-intensive sector to be  a τ  and  l τ  respectively, and the subsidy 
rate in the capital-intensive sector to be  c τ . Now the prices in the rural, labour-intensive 
and capital-intensive sectors are  aa p τ − ,  ll p τ −  and  cc p τ +  respectively. The total tax 
revenue raised from the rural and labour-intensive sectors is denoted as  a ℜ  and  l ℜ  
respectively, and the total subsidy to the capital-intensive sector is denoted as  c ℜ . As in 
Acemoglu (2007), I also introduce two parameters  [0,1] j φ ∈  to measure how much of the 
                                                        
55 In the above utility function of the developing country government,  g U ,  I ψ ρ +  is borrowed from Sah 
and Stiglitz (1987a), and  () c Bq  is similar in form to  () B L  in Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The utility 
function used in this appendix, however, emphasises the strong motives of the developing country 
government to reach a higher level of industrialisation and to leap over some economic development phases 
by taking capital-intensive (heavy) industries or import substitution as a basic development path after 
achieving political independence, which is neglected in Sah and Stiglitz (1987a). Unlike in Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994), the developing country government in this appendix is benevolent, not leviathan. 
56 I assume that there are no non-distortionary lump-sum taxes available in the developing country.   93
tax revenue raised from sector  , j al =   can be redistributed to the capital-intensive 
sector.
57 Now the treasury’s budget constraint is  (1 ) (1 ) aa ll l l c c c φ φσ π σ π ℜ +ℜ +− +− ≥ ℜ . 
 
I assume that  0 a φ =  to reflect the fact that collecting tax from the small and scattered 
rural sector in the developing country is so difficult and costly that all tax revenue just 
covers the cost of collecting tax.
58 Now the treasury’s budget constraint is given by 
(1 ) (1 ) lll l l c c cc qq φτσ π σ π τ +− +− ≥  (7). 
 
Given output prices {( ),( )} ll cc pp τ τ −+ , now the diversification cone of labour-intensive 
and capital-intensive production functions is [,] kk
−













After output price distortion, when kk
− < Δ , the capital-intensive firm, c, will still not be 
able to survive,
59 and  0
c m U < , provided  0 c q > . When kk
−
>Δ , the labour-intensive firm, 
l , would not survive and  0
l m U < , provided  0 l q > . Summarising the analysis above 
gives the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: As long as the capital-intensive production process is operated, output prices 
after distortion should guarantee that the factor endowments in the developing country 
belong to the new diversification cone [,] kk
−
− Δ Δ —that is,  (,) kk k
−










                                                        
57 The parameter  [0,1] φ∈  in Acemoglu (2007) captures ‘state capacity’—that is, the ability of states to 
penetrate and regulate production relations in a society, while in this  chpater,  [0,1] j φ ∈  is interpreted as 
the efficiency of states to collect tax from sector j . 
58 I  assume  0 a φ =   to avoid undue complexity; even the main results in this appendix hold when 
(0,1] a φ ∈ . 
59  We define ‘survivability’ as a firm’s ability to survive in an open, competitive market. With the 
government’s subsidisation and/or protection, a non-viable firm could survive. Similarly, a viable firm 
might not survive if the government’s tax is too heavy.   94
 
From expression(8), we know that as long as the capital-intensive firm is operated, we 
must have  0 l τ >  and 0 c τ > . Thus, at the root of output price distortion in this appendix is 
the developing country government’s pursuit of a catch-up type of CAD strategy—that is, 
taxing labour-intensive firms to subsidise and set up capital-intensive firms. 
 
3.1.2 Depressing factor prices. Given the distorted output prices (,) cc ll pp τ τ +− , the 
market-clearing equilibrium (if equilibrium exists) wage and rental rate of capital in the 
developing country when the capital-intensive firm is operated must be 
' '1' 1 ' 1' 1 () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) cc c c c ll l l l rp A K H p A K H
α αβ β τα τβ
−− −− =+ =−  (9) 
'' ' ' ' () ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) () ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) cc c c c ll l l l wp A KH p A KH
α αβ β τα τβ
−− =+ − =− −  (10) 
where 
'
j K  and 
'




Comparing the equilibrium real wage rate 
*
l wp   and real interest rate 
*
l rp    before 
output price distortion with the market-clearing equilibrium (if equilibrium exists) real 
wage rate 
' () ll wpτ − , which is determined by (10), and the real interest rate 
' () ll rpτ − , 
which is determined by (9) after output price distortion, yields the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: Whenever the capital-intensive sector is operated in the developing country, 
the market-clearing equilibrium (if equilibrium exists) real wage rate (labour-intensive 
good as the numeraire), 
' () ll wpτ − , after output price distortion, must be less than the 
equilibrium real wage rate 
*
l wp  without distortion. The market-clearing equilibrium (if 
equilibrium exists) real interest rate 
' () ll rpτ −   after output price distortion must be 
                                                        
60  When producing capital-intensive products that do not require fixed input—that is, when  0 Γ= or 
1 δ = —the wage rate 
' w  and interest rate 
' r  are the market-clearing equilibrium factor prices, and 
'
j K  
and 
'
j H  are market-clearing equilibrium capital and urban labour used in the firm  , j lc =  respectively 
after output price distortion, which guarantees that the factor endowments in the developing country belong 
to the new diversification cone [,] kk
−
− ΔΔ.   95
greater than the equilibrium real interest rate 
*
l rp  without distortion. 
 



























<<  as long as the capital-intensive sector is operated. Substituting 






















. — QED. 
 
Given the distorted output prices (,) cc ll pp τ τ + −  and the market-clearing equilibrium 
real wage rate 
' () ll wpτ − , which is determined by (10), and real interest rate 
' () ll rpτ − , 
which is determined by (9), from Euler’s theorem on homogeneous functions, we know 
that the capital-intensive firm would incur a net loss of ( )(1 ) cc p τ δ + −Γ  and thus would 
not survive, no matter how much  c τ  and  l τ   are. The net loss, () ( 1 ) cc p τ δ + −Γ , is a 
decreasing function of the capital stock per urban worker, kk δ
− = .
61 The analysis above 
gives the following result. 
 
Proposition 2: A developing country government could not implement a catch-up type of 
CAD strategy successfully just by a single policy instrument of distorting output prices. 
Therefore, the developing country government is obliged to manipulate factor prices as 
well as distort output prices to enforce a catch-up type of CAD strategy successfully—
that is, in addition to distorting output prices, the government has no choice but to reduce 
interest rates or keep the nominal wage rate down, or depress both to successfully enforce 
a catch-up type of CAD strategy. 
 
                                                        
61 Owing to the fact that the capital-intensive firm still could not survive after the output price distortion without factor 
price manipulation, the market-clearing equilibrium wage and rental rates in the developing country are still determined 
by 
** () ( 1 ) ll l wp A k
β τβ =− −  and 
** 1 () ll l rpA k
β τβ
− =−  respectively.   96
We focus here on the role of a low interest rate policy in a developing country’s 
enforcement of the catch-up type of CAD strategy in accordance with the widespread 
financial repression existing in the developing country, and investigate how a low interest 
rate policy can arise from the CAD strategy. To show this, first I need to specify the 
mechanism for urban wage determination. 
 
Given the distorted relative prices of outputs{( ),( ),( )} aa ll cc pp p τ ττ − −+ , I denote the 
manipulated wage and rental rate of capital in the developing country to be  d w  and  d r  
respectively. The indirect utility function of the urban worker after output price distortion 
and factor price manipulation is obtained from 
22
22 2 2 2 2
,
,m a x ( , ) [ ]
al











=+ − − ⎜⎟ −− − − ⎝⎠
 
where 
2 λ  is the urban worker’s positive marginal utility of real income. I assume that the 
government in the developing country can exercise direct control of the urban wage only 
when the real wage rate of urban workers is above subsistence levels. When the real wage 
rate of urban workers equals subsistence level, the government could not reduce the 
urban workers’ real wage further arbitrarily
62—otherwise, in order to compensate for the 
loss of the urban workers’ utility, the government would be obliged to depress the relative 
price of rural products to labour-intensive products.
63 The lower bound value  al p
−
 for the 
relative price of rural products to labour-intensive products assumed above implies that, 
with the purpose of maintaining the utility of urban workers above their subsistence 
                                                        
62 In Sah and Stiglitz (1987a), the government in a socialist economy can exercise direct control of urban 
wages without consideration of the urban workers’ welfare; while in a mixed (non-socialist) economy, the 
urban wage is determined from 
22 (,) Vp wV
−
= —that is, the urban wage will be adjusted in the face of 
changing prices to preserve the welfare of urban workers, and the government in a mixed economy has no 
right to exercise direct control of urban wages. Even in a socialist, planned economy, the government still 
has an obligation to urban workers’ survival by guaranteeing them with enough food and living necessities. 
This  is the reason why, during the agricultural crisis in China in 1959–61, the famine existed in rural areas 
instead of urban areas (Lin and Yang, 2000). 
63 Though the assumption of  0 a φ =  implies that a developing country cannot collect tax directly from the 
rural sector to subsidise the capital-intensive sector, the government still wants to lower the price of rural 
products to compensate for the loss of the urban worker’s welfare. Thus, a large proportion of the costs of 
heavy industry development, through such a mechanism, were transferred implicitly to traditional 
economic sectors such as agriculture (Lin et al., 2003).   97
levels, the minimum real wage rate should be no less than  l w
−
, which satisfies 







Let us assume that urban population 
2 N  and capital stock K  in the developing country, 
productivity parameters (,) cl A A , fixed input Γ, the subsistence level for urban workers 
and rural workers 
12 (, ) VV
−−
, the lower bound value  al p
−
  for the relative price of rural 
products to labour-intensive products, the minimum (real) wage in the developing 
country  l w
−
, and exogenous parameters (,,) α βδ  in the developing country satisfy the 
following assumption: in order to guarantee that the capital-intensive firm will survive, 
the government needs to distort the relative prices of labour-intensive products to capital-
intensive products to such an extent that 




' () ll wpτ −  is determined by (10), which is the market-clearing equilibrium (if 
equilibrium exists) real wage in the developing country when the capital-intensive firm is 
operated. 
 
Consequently, depending on whether Assumption (A1) holds, the government might or 
might not be able to exercise direct control of urban wages at will. When assumption (A1) 
holds, the government cannot exercise direct control of urban wages arbitrarily after 
distorting relative prices of outputs { } () , ( ) , () aa ll cc pp p τ ττ −−+ —therefore, the urban 




Throughout, I presume that Assumption (A1) holds, which ensures the necessity of 
further depressing the interest rates affecting capital-intensive firms in order for the 
                                                        
64 Depending on whether Assumption (A1) holds, there is a possibility of excess demand or excess supply 
of urban workers in this  developing country. When assumption (A1) holds, the redundant employment in 
the urban sector would result endogenously from the government’s pursuit of a catch-up type of CAD 
strategy.   98
government to enforce a catch-up type of CAD strategy successfully, and I denote the 
interest rates affecting the capital-intensive and the labour-intensive firms to be 
c
d r  and 
l
d r  
respectively. Considering low interest rates would reduce the supply of capital—therefore 
decreasing the availability of capital in the developing country—I assume that the 
(nominal) interest rate faced by firm  , j lc =  should be no less than 
*
jr υ , where  j υ  is an 
exogenously given positive parameter; thus, we have 
* j
j d rr υ ≤ . 
 
Given distorted relative prices of outputs {( ),( )} ll cc pp τ τ − +  and depressed factor prices 
{,}
c




                                  ( , , , )
Max max( )[ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ] ,0
cc
c
cc c d d
c
ccc c c d c d c KH
pr w






+− − Γ − −
 (11). 
 
The above capital-intensive firm’s profit maximisation implies that the amount of capital 
and labour used in this  firm must satisfy 
11 () ( ) ( )  o r  () ( 1 ) ( ) ( )
c
cc c c c d cc c c c d p AK H r p A K H w
αα α α τα τ α
−− − +≥ + − ≥  (12) 
with at least one strict inequality in (12). () ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) cc c c c d p AK H w
αα τα
− + −>  is, however, 
impossible according to Assumption (A1). Thus, we have 
11 () ( ) ( )
c
cc c c c d p AK H r
αα τα
−− +> , which implies that we have 
' c
d rr < . Summarising the 
analysis above gives the following result. 
 
Proposition 3: In order to enforce a catch-up type of CAD strategy successfully, the 
government of a developing country is obliged to depress the interest rate from 
' r  to 
c
d r  
as well as distorting output prices, and the depressed interest rate 
c
d r  should guarantee 
that the capital-intensive firm will survive—that is, the RHS in (11) is non-negative. 
 
3.2 The planned resource-allocation system 
Following Bénassy (2006), as I will study the non-clearing markets, we must make an 
important distinction between demands of factors on the one hand and the resulting   99
allocations of factors on the other. The demands of factors, denoted by  ji n % , are signals of 
factor , iH K =  transmitted by firm  , j lc =  to the government before exchange/allocation 
takes place. 
 
Facing the distorted relative prices of outputs {( ),( )} ll cc pp τ τ − +   and the depressed 
factor prices {,}
c
dd wr, the capital-intensive firm’s demands of factors  ci n %  satisfy 
11   () ( ) ( )
() ( 1 ) ( ) ( )
c
cc c c K c H d
cc c c K c K d
















d rr <  and 
'
d ww < , we have 
'
cK c nK > %  and/or 
'
cH c nH < % , where 
'
c K  and 
'
c H  are 
determined by (9) and (10) simultaneously. 
 
Given the distorted relative prices of outputs {( ),( )} ll cc pp τ τ − +  and  the  depressed 
factor prices {, }
l
dd wr, the profit function of the labour-intensive firm is 
{ }
1
, (,,, )M a x m a x ( )() ( ) , 0
ll
ll
ll l dd l ll l l d l d l KH pr w p A KH r K w H
ββ πτ τ
− =− − − . 
 
The above labour-intensive firm’s profit maximisation implies that the amount of capital 
and labour used in this  firm must satisfy 
11 () ( ) ( )  o r  () ( 1 ) ( ) ( )
l
ll l l l d ll l l l d p AK H r p A K H w
ββ β β τβ τ β
−− − −≥ − − ≥ . 
 
From Assumption (A1), () ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ll l l l d p AK H w
ββ τβ
− −− >  could not be true. Thus, we 
must have 
' l
d rr ≤  as the result of 
11 () ( ) ( )
l
ll l l l d p AK H r
ββ τβ
−− − ≥ . 
 
Facing the distorted relative prices of outputs {( ),( )} ll cc pp τ τ − +   and the depressed 
factor prices {, }
l
dd wr, the labour-intensive firm’s demands of factors  li n %  satisfy 
11    ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( 1 ) ( ) ( )
l
ll l l K l H d
ll l l K l H d
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Owing to 
' l
d rr ≤  and 
'
d ww < , we must have 
'
lK l nK ≥ %  and/or 
'
lH l nH < % , where 
'
c K  and 
'
c H  
are determined by (9) and (10) simultaneously. 
 
Therefore, we must have 
''
cK lK c l nnK K K + >+≡ %%  and/or 
''2
cH lH c l nnH H H +<+≡ %% . 
Summarising the analysis above gives the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3: When assumption (A1) holds, a shortage of capital and/or a surplus of urban 
labour will be created in the developing country due to the introduction of a catch-up type 
of CAD strategy. Thus, some rationing will necessarily occur.
65 
 
As we know, the forms of rationing include uniform rationing, queuing, priority systems 
and proportional rationing, depending on the particular organisation of each market 
(Bénassy, 2006). No matter what form the rationing takes, the resulting allocations, 
denoted by 
*
ji n , are exchanges/allocations made by the developing country government, 
the allocation process must satisfy the resulting allocations and the factor supply, denoted 
by 
*
i Z , must be identically balanced for each factor market  , iH K = —that is, 
** * * ( )   for   , il i c i i Nn n Z i H K =+ = = ∑ , where 
*2
H Z H ≡  and 
*
K Z K ≡ . 
 
Owing to the surplus of urban labour, labour-intensive or capital-intensive firms, or both, 
should be forced to employ more labour than what is demanded, which is expressed by 
**  and (or)  lH lH cH cH nn nn ≤≤ %% . 
 
In our model, therefore, the form of rationing chosen by the developing country 
government violates the first property of rationing schemes in Bénassy (2006)—that is, 
voluntary exchange in the labour market. 
 
                                                        
65 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) present a new theory of pervasive shortages under socialism, based on the 
assumption that planners are self-interested, and provide an overview of the standard explanations of 
shortages of goods under socialism. These explanations do not, however, include our reasoning of shortages 
in Developing countries, which is based on the governments’ enforcement of a catch-up type of CAD 
strategy.   101
Furthermore, given distorted relative prices of outputs {( ),( )} ll cc pp τ τ − +  and  the 
resulting allocations of capital 
* (, ) ji niL K =  to  firm  , j lc =   by the developing country 
government, the MVP of capital in the capital-intensive firm is 
*1 * 1 () ( ) ( ) cc c c K c H pA nn
α α τα
− − +  (13) 
and the MVP of capital in the labour-intensive firm is 
*1 * 1 () ( ) ( ) ll l l K l H pA nn
β β τβ
−− −  (14). 
 
As long as (13) is not equal to (14), there always exists a mutually advantageous 
exchange between labour-intensive and capital-intensive firms by transferring the capital 
allocated by the government from one firm to another. Consequently, in our model, the 
form of rationing chosen by the government might violate the second property of 
rationing schemes in Bénassy (2006)—that is, efficient in the capital market. 
 
Considering that the rationing scheme adopted by the government does (might) not 
satisfy two properties in Bénassy (2006), we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: When assumption (A1) holds, the successful implementation of a catch-
up type of CAD strategy in the developing country implies that the only form of rationing 
that could be adopted by the government is allocating capital and urban labour to the 
labour-intensive and capital-intensive firms through priority systems. 
 
In fact, resource allocation is extremely complex and difficult owing to the information 
asymmetry between the government and the firms. I assume that the factor markets were 
visited sequentially (in an order that gave priority to capital-intensive firms) and effective 
demands of factors  (, ) ci ni L K = %  were expressed by capital-intensive firms firstly, after 
the resulting allocations of factors 
* (, ) ci ni L K =  to capital-intensive firms were realised; 
then the remaining factors were allocated to labour-intensive firms, which means 
** * =Z ( , ) li i ci nn i L K −= .
66 
                                                        
66 The equilibrium of resource allocation with non-clearing markets in this appendix is reached through the   102
 
Moreover, in view of the possibility of manager  j m  transferring resources outside firm  j  
to firm  j − , we should make a critical distinction between the resulting allocations of 
factors to firm  , j lc = , denoted by 
* (, ) ji niL K = , on the one hand and the equilibrium 
amount of factors used in firm  j , denoted by 
* (, ) ji niL K = % , on the other. The equilibrium 
amount of factors used in firm  j  is the quantity of factor i finally used in firm  j  where 
all economic forces are balanced, and in the absence of external shocks, 
*
ji n %  will not 
change. 
 
3.3 Depriving a firm of autonomy 
Under the conditions in which prices were distorted and factors were allocated to firms 
by the government through priority systems, profits and losses could no longer reflect 
management performance. Because of information asymmetry, the government’s costs of 
monitoring manager were prohibitively high.
67  Thus, how to guarantee the factors 
allocated by governments to be used in the priority sector—that is, in capital-intensive 
firms—and to avoid the investment arbitrage is of vital importance to the government’s 
successful enforcement of a catch-up type of CAD strategy. As in the pioneering work of 
Grossman and Hart (1986), as well as Hart and Moore (1990), I assume that all of the 
factors used in capital-intensive and labour-intensive firms are ex ante non-verifiable and 
non-contractible. That is, I suppose that it is costly for the government and managers to 
write detailed long-term contracts that specify precisely the uses of factors allocated to 
firms by the government as a function of every possible eventuality and that, as a result, 
the contracts are incomplete (Hart and Moore, 1990). Therefore, the controlling right over 
the use of factors allocated by the developing country government, rather than the 
incentive contract, becomes the critical determinant of the equilibrium of resource 
allocation with non-clearing markets. 
 
Following Shleifer and Vishny (1994), I distinguish firms based on who owns their cash 
                                                                                                                                                                     
non-tâtonnement process in Bénassy (1977). 
67 In the present model, there will be no asymmetries of information between the government and the 
manager.   103
flows (the treasury or manager  j m  of firm  , j lc = ) and who has control rights of the use 
of factors (the government or manager  j m ).
68 In terms of the model above, parameter  j σ  
describes the ownership of cash flows of firm , j lc = , while either the government or the 
managers can control the exact use of the resulting allocation of factors 
*
ji n . The 
allocation of rights over cash flow and control in our model also have an economic 
interpretation like that in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), which means that in a conventional 
state-owned enterprise (SOE), the government controls the exact use of the resulting 
allocations of factors 
*
ji n , and the cash flow is owned mostly by the treasury ( j σ  is low). 
What is more, the allocation of the control right in our model also has a new economic 
interpretation—that is, when the government has full control of the exact use of the 
allocations of factors 
*
ji n , firms are deprived of autonomy in production and management. 
 
In order to prove that the developing country government prefers to deprive a firm of 
autonomy, we need to compute the equilibrium of resource allocation with non-clearing 
markets where the manager and the government have the control rights respectively, and 
then contrast these two equilibria. For the sake of the model’s tractability, I assume that 
the resulting allocation of labour in the capital-intensive firm, 
*
cH n , equals 
'
c H ε Ξ≡ + , 
under government control and under manager control, and Ξ  is an exogenously given 
constant for simplicity, where ε   is a scalar—that is, we have 
*
cH n = Ξ  for  simplicity. 
Thus, the resulting allocation of labour in the labour-intensive firm, 
*
lH n , equals 
2 H −Ξ—that is, 
*2
lH nH =− Ξ . To highlight the mechanism of depriving a firm of 
autonomy in the simplest possible way, let us assume that managers cannot transfer 
labour outside from one firm to another.
69Now the unresolved question is to determine 
who—the government or manager  j m —has the control right over the exact use of the 
                                                        
68 Grossman and Hart (1986) define that a firm consists of those assets that it owns or over which it has 
control. They do not distinguish between ownership and control and virtually define ownership as the 
power to exercise control. 
69  This  assumption might seem too extreme at first glance, but it could be true in some developing 
countries—for example, China, which carries out strict personnel controls through a census registry (hukou) 
institution.   104
resulting allocations of capital, 
*
jK n , in firm  , j lc = . 
 
Before proceeding to compute equilibrium, as a matter of convenience, I need to once 
more describe the utility function of the government in the developing country. Given the 
distorted output prices (,,) aa cc ll ppp τ ττ − +−  and the depressed wage 
rate () dl l l ww p τ
−
≡− , the utility function of the government can be expressed by 
() g c UI B q ψ ρ =+ +  (15) 
where 
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Furthermore, assumption (A1) implies that we have () ( ) aa ll a l p pp τ τ
−
− −≡  and 
() dl l l wp w τ
−
−≡ as well as 
11 2 2 ,,   a n d   , al al l Vp t V Vp w V
−−
−− −




Thus, the utility function of the government can be expressed by 
{} ( )
11 1 22 2
11 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
                               ( )
[( ,) ] ( 1 )
gc
ll
al a a l l l c
cc
UN W V N W V B q
p








=+ + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎧⎫ − ⎡⎤ −− +− − + − − Γ ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
 (16). 
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In the following subsections, I first compute equilibrium under government control—that 
is, the government has the control right over the exact use of the resulting allocations of 
capital, 
*
jK n , in firm  , j lc = —then solve equilibrium under the manager’s control—that is, 
manager  j m  has the control right over the exact use of the resulting allocations of capital, 
*
jK n , in firm  j . Finally, I compare equilibrium under government control with that under 
manager control. 
 
3.3.1 Equilibrium under government control. When the government in a developing 
country has the control right over the exact use of resulting allocations of capital, 
*
jK n , in 
firm  , j lc = , there is no possibility for manager  j m  to transfer capital outside from firm 
j  to firm  j − ; thus, we must have 
**
jij i nn ≡ % —that is, the resulting allocations of factors to 
firm  , j lc =  will always be equal to the equilibrium amount of factors used in that firm. 
In this  way, the government can choose distorted output prices (,,) aa cc ll ppp τ ττ − +− , 
depressed interest rates (,)
cl
dd rr   for capital-intensive and labour-intensive firms 
respectively, and the resulting allocations of capital, 
*
jK n , in firm  j  to maximise utility—
which was expressed in (16) subject to the treasury’s budget constraint (7)—as well as 
the constraints that manager  j m   be kept to his/her reservation utility of zero: 
0
j mj j U σ π ≡≥ . 
 
Given distorted output prices (,) cc ll pp τ τ +− , depressed factor prices (,, )
cl
dd d rrw and the 
resulting allocation of factors 
* (, ) ji niK H =  in firm  , j lc = ,
70 the utility of manager  c m  is 
given by 
*1 * [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ]
c
c
mc c c c c K d c K d c c Up A n r n w p
αα στ τ δ
− ≡+ Ξ − − Ξ − + − Γ  (17) 
and the utility of manager  l m  is given by 
*2 1 * 2 [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
l
l
ml l l l l K d l K d Up A n H r n w H
ββ στ
− ≡ − −Ξ − − −Ξ  (18). 
 
                                                        
70 We have 
*
cH n =Ξ and 
*2
lH nH =− Ξ  based on the assumption that I made above.   106
It is evident that the constraints that manager  j m  be kept to his/her reservation utility of 
zero are binding, which implies that  0 j π = . Owing to  0 j π = , the treasury’s budget 
constraint can be expressed by 
lll cc qq φττ ≥  (19). 
 
The government’s utility maximisation problem above can be solved as follows: 
z  Given output price (, ) ll cc pp τ τ − + , the resulting allocations 
*
ji n  and 
depressed wage rate  d w , the government in the developing country sets the 
depressed interest rate 
j
d r  affecting firm  , j lc =  to maximise the profits of firm 
j . It is evident that the equilibrium interest rate 
* jg
d r  under government control 
in firm  j  equals 
*
jr υ —that is, we have 
** jg
dj rr υ = . 
z  Given the resulting allocations of labour to capital-intensive firm 
*
cH n =Ξ 
and the resulting allocations of labour to labour-intensive firm 
*2
lH nH =− Ξ , if 
the equilibrium amount of capital used in the capital-intensive firm is 
*
cK n , then 
the equilibrium amount of capital used in the labour-intensive firm is 
**
lK cK nK n =− ; and the equilibrium output of labour-intensive and capital-
intensive products produced in the developing country satisfy 
() ( )
*2 1 * 1 ()    a n d    l l cK c c cK qA K n H qA n
βα β α − − =− − Ξ = Ξ  (20). 
z  Plugging the equilibrium output of labour-intensive and capital-intensive 
products in (20) into (16), where 




 is a constant and can 
be passed over, the utility function of the government in the developing country 
can be expressed by 
() ( ) {}
() ( ) ()
*1 1 1 12 2
*2 1 1 1 2 2 * 1
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gc c K a l aa
cc
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UB A n p N F t hcN c
p
p
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%
. 
z  Finally, the government in the developing country chooses the distorted   107
extent of relative prices of labour-intensive products to capital-intensive products 
() () ll cc pp τ τ −− , and the resulting allocations of capital to capital-intensive 
firm 
*
cK n  to maximise  g U % , subject to the constraint that manager  j m  be kept to 
his/her reservation utility of zero and the treasury’s budget constraint, which can 
be expressed by  () ( )
*2 1 * 1 () ll l c K c c c K AK n H An
βα β α φτ τ
− − − −Ξ ≥ Ξ . 
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*1 2 1     [( ) ( ) ( ) ] 0
gl
ll l l l c K d pA K n H r
ββ στ β
−− +− − − − Ξ + = D
 (23) 
where 
g h , 
g
c D  and 
g
l D are the Lagrange multipliers under government control for the 
treasury’s budget constraint and the constraint that managers  c m  and  l m  are kept to their 
reservation utility of zero respectively. 
 
From the first-order conditions above, I can solve the equilibrium tax rate in labour-  108
intensive firm 
*g
l τ , the equilibrium subsidy rate in capital-intensive firm 
*g
c τ  and  the 
resulting allocations of capital 
*g
jK n  in firm  , j lc = ,
71 which are equal to the equilibrium 
amount of capital used in that firm, 
*g
jK n % , under government control. The equilibrium tax 
rate in the rural sector, 
*g
a τ , and the equilibrium (nominal) urban wage 
*g
d w  under 
government control are determined by 
** ()
g g
aa a l l l pp p τ τ
−
=− −  
** ()
g g




Finally, the other equilibrium endogenous variables under government control—for 
example, the equilibrium surplus of the rural good per rural worker 
*g S , equilibrium 
investment 
*g I , equilibrium output of capital-intensive product 
*g
c q  and  equilibrium 
output of labour-intensive product 
*g
l q   under government control—can be determined 
after 
*g
a τ , 
*g
l τ , 
*g
c τ , 
*g
ji n % , 
*g
d w  and 
* jg
d r  have been solved. 
 
Moreover, the constraint that manager  j m  is kept to his/her reservation utility of zero 
implies that I can replace Lagrange multipliers 
g
c D  and 
g
l D  in (21), (22) and (23) with 
gg
cc c σ ′ = DD and 
gg
ll l σ ′ = DD  without changing equilibrium under government control. 
Thus, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: Equilibrium with non-clearing markets under government control is 
independent of  j σ —that is, it is independent of the ownership of the firm’s cash flow.
72 
 
3.3.2 Equilibrium under manager control. Now I need to compute equilibrium with 
non-clearing markets under manager  j m ’s control of the exact use of the resulting 
                                                        
71 Equilibrium under the circumstances is identical to the case of complete contracts for the government in 
the developing country (the ‘first best’ equilibrium from the government’s point of view). 
72  Similar empirical results can be found in Morck and Yeung (2004), who emphasise that political influence is 
proportional to what one controls, not what one owns, notwithstanding the fact that the precise meaning of control in 
this appendix is not identical to that in Morck and Yeung (2004).   109
allocations of capital 
*
jK n  in firm  j . Under manager control, as long as manager  j m  has 
an incentive to transfer capital allocated by the government outside from firm  j  to firm 
j − , the resulting allocations of capital to firm  , j lc =   could not be equal to the 
equilibrium amount of capital used in that firm—that is, 
**
jKj K nn ≠ % . 
 
As in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), however, in our model, the fact that manager  j m  has 
the control right over the use of capital allocated by the government does not mean the 
manager will transfer all of the resources outside from firm  j  to firm  j − . Indeed, the 
government could try to convince managers  c m  and  l m   to produce an acceptable 
quantity of capital-intensive products,  c q , and a desirable quantity of labour-intensive 
products,  l q , by means of changing the distorted extent of the relative output prices 
() () cc ll pp τ τ +− , whereby the government might affect the relative return of capital 
between labour-intensive and capital-intensive firms. Therefore, based on the cooperative 
game theory, the governmentg , manager  c m  and manager  l m  could bargain to a superior 
allocation by producing an appropriate quantity of capital-intensive products and labour-
intensive products and distorting the relative output prices () () cc ll pp τ τ + −  to  an 
appropriate extent simultaneously. 
 
Following Hart and Moore (1990), in the model presented below, I assume that the 
relationships among the government g , manager  c m  and manager  l m  could be described 
and analysed by an incomplete contract and I also assume that the ex post distribution of 
pay-off is governed by a (multilateral bargaining) coalitional form game. The solution 
concept that I adopt for the coalitional game is the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953; 
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Winter, 2002).
73 
 
The chronology of all agents’ main events and their decisions is shown as follows: 
z  The government distorts the relative output prices () () cc ll pp τ τ +−  and 
                                                        
73 The application of the Shapley value to impute joint costs or interrelated revenues was suggested first by 
Shubik (1962).   110
gives priority to the capital-intensive firm by allocating capital with price 
c
d r  and 
urban labour with price  d w  to this firm. The amount of capital and urban labour 
allocated to the capital-intensive firm is 
*
cK n  and 
*
cH n = Ξ  respectively. After the 
resulting allocations of factors 
* (, ) ci ni L K =   to the capital-intensive firm have 
been realised, the remaining factors with price 
l
d r  and  d w  are allocated to the 
labour-intensive firm, which means 
** * =Z ( , ) li i ci nn i L K −= . 
z  Manager  , j lc =  decides how much of the resulting allocations of capital 
will be diverted from firm  j  to firm  j − . I denote the amount of the resulting 
allocations of capital diverted to be χ . In fact, there are only two possible 
directions of capital transfer: from the capital-intensive firm to the labour-
intensive firm or vice versa. If χ  is permitted to be negative, the above decision 
problem of manager  l m  and/or  manager  c m  will  always  be  described 
equivalently, as manager  c m  decides how much of the resulting allocations of 
capital, denoted by χ , to be diverted from his/her firm to the labour-intensive 
firm. When manager  c m  has an incentive to transfer capital to a labour-intensive 
firm, we have  0 χ > , and when manager  l m  has an incentive to transfer capital 
to a capital-intensive firm, we have  0 χ < . Thus, there is a wedge, denoted by χ , 
between the equilibrium amount of capital used in the capital-intensive firm, 
denoted by 
*
cK n % , and the resulting allocations of capital, denoted by 
*
cK n —that is, 
**
cK cK nnχ =− % . 
z  The government, manager  l m  and manager  c m  decide on the division of 
the pay-off by a (multilateral bargaining) coalitional form game. 
z  Output is produced and the pay-off is distributed according to their 
Shapley values. 
 
I will use a sub-game perfect equilibrium to characterise the non-market clearing 
equilibrium under manager control, and the pay-offs distributed in all sub-games are   111
determined by the Shapley values. Borrowing some notations used in Winter (2002), in 
the present model I can describe the coalitional game among the government g , manager 
c m  and manager  l m  in an explicit way—that is, a coalitional game on a finite set of three 
players is a function, ν , from the set of all 
3 28 =  coalitions to the set of real numbers    
with  ()0 ν ∅= .  () S ν   represents the total pay-off the coalitions, S , could get in the 
coalitional game, ν . A value is an operator φ  that assigns to each game ν , a vector of 
pay-offs,  () ( , , )
cl gm m φ νφ φ φ =  in 
3   .  () ι φ ν  stands for player ι ’s ( ,, cl g mm ι = ) pay-off in 
the game. 
 
Each player ι ’s Shapley value is an operator that assigns the player the expected marginal 
contributions or the average contributions to all coalitions, S , that consist of players 
( ,, cl g mm ι = ) ordered in all feasible permutations. More specifically, I denote Π to be a 
permutation of the set of players and Π to be the set of all feasible permutations. Let us 
imagine the players appearing one by one to collect their pay-off according to the order 
Π (Winter, 2002); then the marginal contribution of player ι  with respect to that order, 
Π , is  () ( )
ι ι ν ιν ΠΠ ⊥∪− ⊥   if I denote by  {: ( ) () }
ι κ ικ Π ⊥= Π > Π   the set of players 
preceding player ι   in the order Π  for  each  player ι . Under these circumstances, the 
player ι ’s Shapley value in the coalitional game ν  is 
Shapley 1
() [( ) ( ) ]
3!
ιι
ι φν ν ι ν ΠΠ
Π∈Π
=⊥ ∪ − ⊥ ∑  (24). 
 
As in Shubik (1962), I can give the characteristic function for the above coalitional game 
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Now I can solve the sub-game perfect equilibrium by means of a backward solution as 
follows: 
z  Facing the given output prices ( , cc ll pp τ τ + − ), the given factor prices 
( ,,
cl
ddd wrr) and the resulting allocations of factors 
* (, ) ji niL K =  to  firm  j , 





        ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) 0
c
cc c cc K d
l
ll l l c K d
pA n r







⎡⎤ −+ − Ξ − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ +− − + − Ξ − = ⎣⎦
 (25). 
z  The government chooses the distorted relative output prices 
( , cc ll pp τ τ +− ), the interest rate affecting capital-intensive and labour-intensive 
firms ( ,
cl
dd rr ), the resulting allocations of factors 
* (, ) ji niL K =  to firm  , j lc =  to 
maximise ({ , , }) cl g mm ν  subject to the treasury’s budget constraint, which can 
be expressed by 
*2 1 * 2
*1 *
*2 1 *1
( 1 ) [ ( ) () ( ) () ( ) ]
(1 )[( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ]
                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
l
ll l l c K d c K d
c
cc c c c K d c K d c c
ll l c K c c c K
p A Kn H r Kn wH
pA n r n wp
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− − − + −Ξ − − + − −Ξ
+− + − Ξ − − − Ξ − + − Γ
+− +− Ξ ≥− Ξ
 (26). 
 
It is obvious that the equilibrium interest rate 
* jm
d r   under manager control in firm  j  
equals 
*
jr υ —that is, we have 
** jm
dj rr υ = . Furthermore, the government’s decision should 
satisfy the following first order condistions: 
{ }
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 (29) 
where 
m ϑ  is the Lagrange multiplier under manager control for the treasury’s budget 
constraint. 
 
In sub-game perfect equilibrium under manager control, the equilibrium amount of 
capital used in the capital-intensive firm, denoted by 
*m
cK n % , must equal the resulting 
allocations of capital to this firm, denoted by 
*m
cK n —that is, 
** mm
cK cK nn = % . Thus, in sub-game 
perfect equilibrium, the amount of capital diverted outside from the capital-intensive firm 
to the labour-intensive firm should equal zero—that is, 
* 0 χ = . 
 
Plugging 
* 0 χ =  into equations (26), (27), (28) and (29), I can solve the equilibrium tax 
rate in the labour-intensive firm 
*m
l τ , the equilibrium subsidy rate in the capital-intensive 
firm 
*m
c τ , and the resulting allocations of capital 
*m
jK n  in firm  , j lc = , which are equal to 
the equilibrium amount of factors used in that firm 
*m
ji n %  under manager control. 
 
The equilibrium tax rate in the rural sector 
*m
a τ  and the equilibrium (nominal) urban wage 
*m
d w  under manager control are determined by 
** ()
mm
aa a l l l pp p τ τ
−
=− −  
** ()
mm
dl l l ww p τ
−
=− .   115
 
The other equilibrium endogenous variables under manager control—for example, the 
equilibrium surplus of the rural good per rural worker 
*m S , the equilibrium investment 
*m I , the equilibrium output of capital-intensive product 
*m
c q  and the equilibrium output of 
labour-intensive product 
*m
l q  under manager control—can be determined after 
*m
a τ , 
*m
l τ , 
*m
c τ , 
*m
ji n % , 
*m
d w  and 
* jm
d r  have been solved. 
 
Finally, based on the characteristic function for the above coalitional game, applying the 
Shapley value in (24), we obtain 
[ ]
[] [ ]
Shapley               2 ({ }) ({ , }) ({ }) 1
3! ({ , }) ({ }) 2 ({ , , }) ({ , })
cc
g
l l cl cl
gg mm




⎧⎫ +− + ⎪⎪ = ⎨⎬




Shapley               2 ({ }) ({ , }) ({ }) 1




cl l cl l
mg m g




⎧⎫ +− + ⎪⎪ = ⎨⎬




Shapley               2 ({ }) ({ , }) ({ }) 1




cl c cl c
mg m g




⎧⎫ +− + ⎪⎪ = ⎨⎬
−+ − ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
. 
 
Comparing equilibrium under manager control with that under government control yields 
the following proposition (proof in the Appendix). 
 
Proposition 6: To successfully enforce a catch-up type of CAD strategy in its country, 
the developing country government always prefers its control over the exact use of the 
resulting allocation of capital to the firm  , j lc = , denoted by 
*
jK n , rather than that of 
manager  j m —that is, the government would like to deprive the firm of autonomy.
75 
 
Finally, from the proof of Proposition 6 attached at the end of the appendix as a technical 
note, we know that, from the government’s point of view, the root of equilibrium under 
                                                        
75 The justification for the developing country government’s deprivation of a firm’s autonomy is analogous 
to the case in Burkart et al. (2003), which examines whether entrepreneurs want to surrender control of 
their firms, by comparing the potential benefits of owner control with the forgone benefits of rendering 
control to capable outside professional managers—although the role of capable outside professional 
managers is ignored in our model for tractability.   116
manager control is inferior to that under government control when the manager has the 
arbitrage opportunity of diverting capital from one firm to the other, as described in first 
order conditions in (25). Had arbitrage opportunities for diverting capital from one firm 
to the other disappeared, equilibrium under manager control would be identical to that 
under government control for the developing country government. These arbitrage 
opportunities will not exist if either  0 l σ =  or  0 c σ = —that is, either firm c or firm l is 
purely state owned and has no ownership of cash flow. Therefore, we have the following 
corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: Equilibrium with non-clearing markets under manager control depends on 
the exact value of  j σ —that is, on the ownership of a firm’s cash flow. Moreover, the 
government prefers the exact value of  j σ  to be zero under manager control—that is, the 
government prefers the firms to be owned completely by the state.
76 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
There exist widespread distorted institutional arrangements and interventionist policies, 
such as price distortion, financial repression, trade restriction, rationing of capital and 
foreign exchange, licensing of investments, administrative monopoly and state ownership 
in many developing countries, whether they are socialist countries such as China, the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, or non-socialist countries such as 
India and many Latin American countries. The main purpose of this appendix is to 
construct a simple three-sector model to show that the fundamental logic of these 
distorted institutional arrangements and interventionist policies in a developing country 
arises from its government’s attempt to develop advanced, capital-intensive industries 
when the characteristic of the country’s endowments is relatively capital scarce due to its 
                                                        
76 It is assumed in the model that there is an information asymmetry between the government and the 
managers. Therefore, once the firm is state owned and the cash flow is completely controlled by the 
government, there is no need for the government to deprive the manager’s control rights over the use of 
capital and other resources. In reality, however, information between the government and managers is 
asymmetrical and the manager has some control in the use of cash flow. If the manager has the control right 
over the use of resources, the diversion of resources for the manager’s on-the-job consumption and other 
moral hazard behaviour could occur. Therefore, the government would deprive the manager of autonomy, 
even if the firm was state owned. In effect, this is what happened in the planning system in China, Russia 
and other socialist countries.   117
political leaders’ aspiration for nation building, modernization, and political 
independence in the country, as discussed in the Lectures. 
 
Retrospectively, the CAD strategy seems to be extremely inappropriate and even absurd 
according to today’s thinking, it was initiated by idealistic nationalist leaders behaving as 
benevolent guardians with bounded rationality. Deeply influenced by their own aspiration 
for nation building, the radical view of economic development, Keynesian theory at that 
time and the successful experience of the Soviet Union’s industrialization under Stalin’s 
leadership before World War II, most developing countries—socialist and non-socialist—
adopted a catch-up type of CAD strategy to accelerate the growth of capital-intensive, 
advanced sectors in their countries after World War II. Many firms in the priority sectors 
of this strategy were non-viable in open, competitive markets because the priority sectors 
were not compatible with their economies’ comparative advantages. The model shows 
that the government intervention—including distorted prices for products and essential 
factors of production, highly centralised, planned resource-allocation systems and a 
micro-management mechanism in which firms were deprived of autonomy—was 
endogenous to the needs of maximising resource mobilisation to build up the priority 
sectors and to support non-viable firms in those sectors. Thus, given the government’s 
motivation—that is, pursuing a catch-up type of CAD strategy—these distorted economic 
institutions and interventionist policies in the developing countries were second-best 
arrangement.
77  Therefore, as Lin and Li (forthcoming) show, without addressing the 
firms’ viability issue and giving up the catch-up type of CAD strategy, the 
implementation of price liberalisation, privatisation and elimination of other distortions—
as advocated by the Washington Consensus—would result in poorer economic 
performance in developing countries than that before the reform. 
                                                        
77 I share the view of Krueger (1995)—that is, many of the policies that eventually became so inimical to 
growth appear to have been adopted for idealistic motives, and not for the narrow self-interest of the groups 
in the ruling coalition.   118
Technical Note 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Proof by contradiction: it is obvious that equilibrium under manager control can be 
obtained by government control.
78 Thus, equilibrium under government control weakly 
dominates equilibrium under manager control from the viewpoint of the developing 
country government. If I can prove that equilibrium under manager control could not 
always equal equilibrium under government control, the developing country government 
will prefer equilibrium under government control to that under manager control, which is 
the result in Proposition 6—that is, DEVELOPING COUNTRY governments would like 
to deprive firms of autonomy. 
 
Let us first assume that equilibrium under government control is always identical to that 
under manager control—that is, we have 
** mg
cc τ τ = , 
** mg
ll τ τ =  and 
** mg
jij i nn = %% , etc. 
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* 0 χ =  into (27) implies that in SPE under manager control, we have 
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78 The model set-up in this  appendix could guarantee that either equilibrium under government control or 
equilibrium under manager control is unique.   119
Comparing (30) with (31), under the assumption that equilibrium under government 
control is identical to that under manager control, we must have 
g m ϑ = h  and 
(1 )
gm
ll l l σ ϑσ σ =− − + D . 
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* 0 χ =  in SPE under manager control with (28) yields 
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Comparing (32) with (33) implies that, under the assumption that equilibrium under 
government control is identical to that under manager control, we must have 
g m ϑ = h  and 
(1 )
gm




d r  with 
*
jr υ  in (23) means that under government control, we have 
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Substituting 
** jm
dj rr υ =  and 
* 0 χ =  into (25) implies that the SPE under manager control 
should satisfy 
** 1 1 *
** 1 2 1 *
       ( ) ( ) ( )
() () ( )
mm
cc ccc K c
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l l l l cK l
pA n r







⎡⎤ +Ξ − = ⎣⎦





Plugging (35) and 
* 0 χ =  into (29) delivers 
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Comparison of (34) with (36) implies that, under the assumption that equilibrium under 
government control is identical to that under manager control, we must have 
g m ϑ = h , 
g m
cc σ ϑ = D  and 
g m




cc σ ϑ = D  into  (1 )
gm
cc c c σ σϑ σ =+ − D  gives  1
m ϑ = . Combining 
(1 )
gm
ll l l σ ϑσ σ =− − + D  and 
g m









, which means that  1 l σ = , 
owing to  1
m ϑ = . Furthermore, we have  1
g
l ≡ D ,  1
g ≡ h  and  1
g
cc σ ≡ D   after a simple 
arithmetic operation. 
 
It is well known that the Lagrange multiplier has an economic interpretation as the 
shadow price associated with the constraint. The necessary conditions above that 
guarantee that equilibrium under government control is always identical to that under 
manager control—that is,  1
m ϑ = ,  1 l σ = ,  1
g
l ≡ D , 1
g ≡ h  and  1
g
cc σ ≡ D —imply that 
equilibrium under government control being identical to that under manager control is a   121
special case only. 
 
Therefore, developing country governments prefer equilibrium under government control 
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